nuclear suicide formalized.
the invertebrate PM's dissimulation exposed.
· IAEA Director-General Mohamed El-Baradei's introductory statement to the Governing Board meeting yesterday has demolished Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's claim, based on preambular references, that the safeguards agreement assures uninterrupted supply of fuel and allows India to take "corrective measures". Dr. El-Baradei said the preamble merely provided for "contextual background" and that the IAEA inspections are to be "implemented in accordance with the terms of the agreement". The articles of the agreement contain no reference to "fuel supply" or to a "strategic reserve of nuclear fuel" or to "corrective measures".
"Corrective measures" are also ruled out by the fact that the safeguards on Indian facilities are indefinite and irrevocable. India thus is explicitly blocked from ever undertaking real correction in response to a fuel supply cut-off — the lifting of IAEA safeguards. In Dr. El-Baradei's words, "the agreement is of indefinite duration. There are no conditions for the discontinuation of safeguards other than those provided by the safeguards agreement itself. The termination provisions contained in the agreement are the same as for other 66-type agreements. Naturally -- as with all safeguards agreements -- this agreement is subject to the general rules of international law. Therefore, the agreement should be read as an integral whole. The preamble provides for contextual background and safeguards are implemented in accordance with the terms of the agreement".
· Dr. El-Baradei's statement also makes clear that there is nothing "India-specific" about the safeguards agreement with India. "The text before you is an INFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreement based on the Agency´s standard safeguards practices and procedures," Dr. El-Baradei stated. Even the "termination provisions contained in the agreement are the same as for other 66-type agreements," according to Dr. El-Baradei.
The India-IAEA safeguards accord is modelled on the INFCIRC/66 system, which was designed for Non-Nuclear-Weapons States (NNWSs) to cover individual plants and shipments of fuel.
The Government has agreed to place India's entire civilian nuclear programme under NPT-system safeguards designed for Non-Nuclear-Weapons States (NNWSs), with none of the rights the five established Nuclear-Weapons States (NWSs) have vis-à-vis the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). India is embracing not the voluntary, token and revocable inspections the NWSs accept on a few facilities. Rather, India is the first nuclear-armed state to agree to perpetual, legally immutable inspections covering its full civilian programme.
· In his press statement following the agreement's approval by the Governing Board, Dr. El-Baradei went one step further to say this accord lays the foundation for India observing the objectives of the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) and the proposed FMCT (Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty). In Dr. El-Baradei's words: "A concrete result of that would be a comprehensive moratorium by all states that have nuclear weapons not to test at any time in the future, until the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty comes into force, which I hope will happen soon. I hope it will also lead to a moratorium on production of any nuclear material for weapons purposes, until we have the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty in force."
· The fact that the governing board of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) approved "by consensus" the safeguards agreement with India shows that this accord meets all the non-proliferation standards and expectations. The accord, in fact, opens the path to drafting India into the NPT regime as a de facto party.
Here is the full text of El-Baradei's introductory statement and press statement:
Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors
by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei
August 1, 2008
Our agenda for this meeting covers issues relevant to safeguards, technical cooperation and management.
Draft Safeguards Agreement with India
I am pleased to put before you the draft Agreement with the Government of India for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities. As the Secretariat has already provided an extensive briefing on this, I will emphasize just a few points.
The text before you is an INFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreement based on the Agency´s standard safeguards practices and procedures. These 66-type agreements are not comprehensive or full-scope safeguards agreements. They are concluded in accordance with Article III.A.5 of the Agency's Statute and provide for the application of safeguards to specific facilities or other relevant items. In the case of the draft before you, it is an "umbrella agreement", which provides for any facility notified by India to the Agency in the future to become subject to safeguards. The draft also envisages the possibility of applying current Agency safeguards in India under this new agreement by suspending, subject to agreement by the relevant parties, the application of safeguards under existing agreements. The "umbrella" nature of this agreement provides a more efficient mechanism for ensuring that safeguards requirements can be met. It satisfies India´s needs while maintaining all the Agency´s legal requirements. Such an "umbrella" approach could also be used for the conclusion of other 66-type safeguards agreements. As you can see from India´s Plan, which has been circulated for the information of all IAEA Member States, a total of 14 reactors are envisaged to come under Agency safeguards by 2014. I should note that the Agency already applies safeguards to six of these 14 reactors under existing 66 type agreements with India. We expect to start implementing the agreement at new facilities in 2009. Facilities will be notified by India to the Agency in stages and the Secretariat will keep you informed when facilities are submitted for safeguards.
As with other safeguards agreements between the Agency and Member States, "the agreement is of indefinite duration. There are no conditions for the discontinuation of safeguards other than those provided by the safeguards agreement itself. The termination provisions contained in the agreement are the same as for other 66-type agreements. Naturally -- as with all safeguards agreements -- this agreement is subject to the general rules of international law. Therefore, the agreement should be read as an integral whole. The preamble provides for contextual background and safeguards are implemented in accordance with the terms of the agreement" [emphasis added].
Finally, I should note that India and the IAEA have already begun discussions on an additional protocol to the draft safeguards agreement.
IAEA Chief Addresses India Safeguards Agreement
1 August 2008
During a press conference today, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei spoke to international media regarding the IAEA Board of Governors approval of the India Safeguards Agreement. Following are excerpts from the press conference.
"The Board of Governors this afternoon adopted by consensus the agreement to apply safeguards to civilian nuclear facilities in India. I believe the agreement is good for India, is good for the world, is good for non-proliferation, is good for our collective effort to move towards a world free from nuclear weapons. What the agreement does is bring India closer to the debate on our ultimate goal, which is the goal of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – to establish a world free from nuclear weapons.
"I have always maintained that if we were to move forward toward strengthening non-proliferation to reduce the nuclear weapons arsenal, toward moving to a world free from nuclear weapons, that dialogue has to be universal and inclusive. We cannot exclude from that debate India or Pakistan or Israel - the three countries who remain outside the NPT. These represent 20% of the world´s population and they have to be included.
"India committed itself to harmonize its laws on export controls with those of the supplier group. That´s very important because one of our main goals continues to be that nuclear material will not fall into the wrong hands.
"India has 1.1 billion people. They need a tremendous amount of electricity for development. India is the fifth largest consumer of energy, and will be the third largest consumer of energy by 2030. The option of not making full use of nuclear energy is to continue to rely even more heavily on coal and gas and oil, with the impact of course on climate change. Allowing India to make full use of nuclear energy and state of the art technology, is also again good for the world. It ensures safety, security and development.
"I look at the agreement from a big picture, and the big picture is that I hope the agreement will reignite the debate on nuclear disarmament. It would hopefully create a new environment of partnership - and not of isolation - that will bring India together. A concrete result of that would be a comprehensive moratorium by all States that have nuclear weapons not to test at any time in the future, until the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty comes into force, which I hope will happen soon.
"I hope it will also lead to a moratorium on production of any nuclear material for weapons purposes, until we have the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty in force.
"The India Safeguards Agreement could have, if properly implemented, a lot of positive implications, development implications, security implications, non-proliferation implications, and arms control implications. I have been supporting the agreement from day one and am very happy today that I see that my judgment has been certified by the Board in approving the agreement by consensus."