Saturday, February 25, 2006

me on rediff on france and the us and india's relations with both

feb 25th

http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/feb/25rajeev.htm

12 comments:

gopinath said...

I think India has to realise its Buying power, and most important make the negotiators in New Delhi learn lessons from Corporate world. And it is important we do this more and more even on a very very minor deal, involving any country. If you read any corporate bulletins in the US and UK, every big Corporation has India on their radar as significant market, and definitely these corporation have very powerful role in shaping that Country's foreign poilicies, so this must sink in our blood and become excellent negotiators, and be ruthless, and remember there is nothing wrong in being ruthless, for the good of your own country.
Jai Hind.

KapiDhwaja said...

Good article. More than not being adept at negotiations, India has a lot of moles who want to sell the country to the Vatican & the West. Liked the last line from Voltaire. Here is another well known gem from one of the greatest minds of modern times,

Albert Einstein: "We owe a lot to the Indians, who taught us how to count, without which no worthwhile scientific discovery could have been made!"

Shahryar said...

Perhaps Indian Civil servants should keep an eye on Chinese news!

Boeing losing dominance in China


www.chinaview.cn 2005-06-16 10:57:19

BEIJING, June 16 -- In the CEO's office at Xiamen Airlines, one of Boeing's most loyal customers sits beside a photo of a 737 cockpit and describes the humiliation he felt trying to enter the United States last year.

Wu Rongnan runs the only domestic carrier in China that still has an all-Boeing fleet. As he takes a long draw on an English 555-brand cigarette, however, the 62-year-old Wu says the affronts he experienced on his way to Seattle in December were "a bitter pill."

To obtain a visa, he spent three hours in line at the American consulate in far-off Guangzhou and was fingerprinted, something he considers suitable only for criminals. Then, at the immigration counter in Los Angeles, he was treated rudely and escorted to a room for questioning, despite the invitation from Boeing in his hand.

"It must be that America is so rich that they don't want our money," he said. Wu's reaction is a symptom of problems that have compounded to erode Boeing's longtime dominance in China, handing the advantage to European rival Airbus in the world's most promising growth market.

Some of the problems are beyond Boeing's control. But others stem from the company's own mistakes, according to interviews with a range of Chinese airline executives, government officials, former Boeing employees and others.

After its longtime China manager left the company unhappily, a revolving door of executives were dispatched for short-term stints in China.

Since most were unfamiliar with the language and culture, it was harder for them to build strong relationships. As Boeing management focused on keeping costs down and pushing sales, it missed opportunities suggested by its own employees to foster goodwill. And some customers felt Boeing fell short in training and support after they bought its planes.

One manager at China Southern Airlines, China's largest domestic airline, invokes a Chinese proverb to describe Boeing's behavior: "Pick up a sesame seed, lose sight of a watermelon."

In other words, Boeing lost sight of the big picture.

"They've been rather dense in their dealings with China," said Sidney Rittenberg, a noted China expert and business consultant. "People they've had working with China were not that good at reading cross-cultural issues and dealing with the Chinese. The Airbus people have made a science out of it."

Ten years ago, more than eight out of every 10 commercial jets flown in China were Boeing planes. Now about six of 10 are. Airbus' share of new airplane deliveries to China rocketed from 18 percent in 1993 to 67 percent last year, according to Back Aviation Solutions.

Xiamen, this bustling city on China's southeastern coast, illustrates the potential that China holds for both companies. Business travelers from nearby Taiwan are multiplying rapidly. So are local customers like the stylish young tourists strolling along the city's picturesque boardwalk.

In the next two decades, Chinese airlines are expected to triple their fleets, adding 2,300 jets worth nearly US$200 billion.

Recent evidence suggests Boeing may be pulling itself out of its decade-long downturn in China. It hired a veteran China executive to head its Beijing office and improve relations with government leaders. It bounced back strongly this year with the sale of 60 of its new 787 jets to Chinese airlines.

While these are promising signs for Boeing, regaining its dominant role in China may require corporate leadership that is more nimble, humble and ethnically diverse.

Boeing sold its first airplanes to the People's Republic of China in 1972, six years before the United States had formal diplomatic relations with the country. The company blazed a trail of airplane sales right on the heels of President Nixon's historic visit.

A pioneering spirit drove Boeing's early efforts, said James Chorlton, one of the first Boeing salesmen sent to China.

"We used to have people fighting for a chance to go to China," he said. "We wanted to help this country get started. They didn't have enough roads or enough railways, and a billion people were starting to move around."

At that time Chinese found Boeing planes superior to their existing Russian prop planes and British Trident jets.

(Source: Shenzhen Daily/Agencies)

Shahryar said...

Airbus unveils $10bn Chinese deal

European aircraft maker Airbus has agreed to sell 150 A320 planes to China in a deal worth almost $10bn (£5.7bn)
The agreement is a major boost for the manufacturer as it battles US rival Boeing for supremacy in the world's fastest growing aviation market.

The planes, seating up to 185 people, will be used by six Chinese carriers.

The deal was signed during a meeting between Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and his French counterpart Dominique de Villepin on Monday.

Fierce rivalry

Aviation experts said the deal was worth about $9.7bn to Airbus.

Airbus and Boeing are engaged in fierce competition to meet the demands of China's airlines.

Boeing, which currently controls 70% of the Chinese market, signed a $4bn deal to supply 70 aircraft to China last month.

Airbus has been looking to grab a much larger slice of China's civil aviation market, in which it currently has a 28% market share.

Vote of confidence

Airbus chief executive Gustav Humbert said the deal showed a "new and significant vote of confidence in our best-selling aircraft family from our Chinese customers".

Airbus has sold 216 aircraft from the A320 series - consisting of A319, A320 and A321 planes - to China since 1995.

The planes are single-aisle aircraft, with a capacity ranging from 107 to 185 seats.

The planes will be shared between Air China, China Eastern Airlines, China Southern Airlines, Sichuan Airlines, Shenzhen Airlines and Hainan Airlines.

Chinese officials said they were looking forward to an "ever closer" relationship with Airbus.

"We are very pleased to sign the record-breaking agreement with Airbus today and to be a part of this historic order for China," said Li Hai, president of China Aviation Supplies Import and Export Group.

Made in China?

Airbus and Boeing are both benefiting from huge demand for civilian aircraft in China, where annual passenger traffic is expected to rise to 500 million by 2010.

Airbus has already signed an agreement to increase industrial co-operation with Beijing.

The agreement, signed during Mr Wen's visit to Airbus' Toulouse headquarters on Sunday, could see the European aircraft maker assembling some planes in China.

Airbus is owned by pan-European aerospace firm EADS and British defence company BAE Systems.




Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/business/4498794.stm

Published: 2005/12/05 14:55:11 GMT

© BBC MMV

Sage said...
This comment has been removed by the author.
Ram said...

This article is a clear example of an author not crystallizing his thoughts before attempting to say something.

The article starts off promising - trying to analyze the nuclear deal between US and India and then moves on to the abstract ideas behind the relationships. Finally, it concludes in a ramble of other people's opinions.

Rajeev should decide whether he represents the intellectual right (of centre ) or he is an impartial observer with no bias. Maybe that will end his confusion.

But, I confess I like reading his ramblings because he always defines the problems correctly and rambles only when he wears his prescriptive hat or his conclusion hat

san said...

The Atlanticists are showing their impatience with their jihadi surrogates:

http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/02/26/opinion/edcartoon.php

If the NYT is saying it, then you know the Europeans are finally getting irritated.

doubtinggaurav said...

Rajeev,

Amazing article.

Regards

KapiDhwaja said...

Nuke Deal: The US has a lot more to lose than India, in case the deal fails.

indianpatriot said...

George’s nuclear durbar
- By Bharat Karnad



But for Dr Anil Kakodkar’s coming out publicly, albeit a bit late in the day, against the proposed nuclear deal with the United States and the lining up of nuclear establishment stalwarts, like Dr P.K. Iyengar, Dr A. Gopalakrishnan, Dr A.N. Prasad and even Dr M.R. Srinivasan who was consulted by the Prime Minister’s Office, behind the current chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, this transaction would have gone through on largely American terms as Washington had hoped it would. This nearly occurred because the media uncritically bought the line that India should not miss out on this "strategic opportunity" to ride the US coat-tails to great power.

It apparently matters little that most of the advocates of the deal are unfamiliar with the nuclear technologies involved and the implications for the country of voluntarily restraining their continued indigenous development. Indeed, the most vociferous among them have tried to make such ignorance out to be a virtue by arguing that technical details should not obscure the larger political aims that are ostensibly served by falling in with the Americans! In an effort, moreover, to browbeat a Congress Prime Minister with a questionable grasp of foreign and security policy, the case of Indira Gandhi’s accepting US violation of a binding international legal contract to supply enriched uranium fuel for the lifetime of the two Tarapur Light Water reactors, has been exhumed. The exact opposite lesson needs to be learned from the Tarapur episode, namely, that unless a supplier country is dragged into court for not meeting contractual obligations and made to pay stiff damages, the same country can turn around, as the US has done, and offer still more audacious deals in the belief that these can be forced down the apparently willing throat of the Indian government and that there will be no costs for violating with impunity any understanding. Had the Tarapur case been taken to international arbitration, Washington would have been wary of promising this country the (energy) moon-qua-imported reactors. On this last issue, moreover, is it enough for New Delhi to link the safeguards to uninterrupted foreign fuel supply? How is India going to be compensated for the Rs 250,000 crores (Dr A. Gopalakrishnan’s figures) it will have to ante up for the reactors imported from the US, France, or Russia producing 35,000 MW of electricity? And should the Indian government not insist contractually on supplier countries guaranteeing the return of this vast sum (after depreciation) in case they cease supply of fuel for any reason?

It is the historical and geopolitical raisons d’ĂȘtre provided by K. Subrahmanyam and embroidered by his associate, which are legitimating this deal among the unthinking political class, and the Foreign Office and other bureaucracies, and need to be contested. Subrahmanyam has referred repeatedly to two historical examples of great powers helping lesser states with potential to become major powers. The first case pertains to a supposedly weak Imperial Japan in the early years of the 20th century which, according to Subrahmanyam, was assisted by Britain, the then predominant power, to "balance" an expansive Czarist Russia in the Far East. But historical facts, alas, suggest something quite different. With the restoration of Emperor Meiji, after the Tokugawa period, and the impetus given to "westernisation" and military modernisation by him, Japan had by the 1890s built up a huge economic, political and industrial presence in China and the Korean peninsula. Britain, as one of the main beneficiaries of the "Open Doors" Policy, had likewise acquired a significant stake in China. Almost on par militarily, Japan and Britain, desirous of protecting their investments in China and Korea, decided on jointly checkmating Russia’s ambitions to carve out territories at their expense. They agreed in January 1902 on a naval treaty, which prevented Britain — "perfidious Albion" — from expediently joining Moscow to neutralise Tokyo’s naval war plans which ended in the decisive Japanese naval victory over the Russian fleet in the Tsushima straits in 1905. To construe this as in any way an analogue of the US helping India become a counterweight to China in the 21st century is to reduce history to a joke.

The other example Subrahmanyam is prone to cite, concerns China accepting US "help" in the Seventies leading to Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms, opening up of the American market to Chinese exports, etc. Mis-analogy is even more marked here. China, was by the late Sixties in a position militarily to deter the US with its small number of thermonuclear megaton warheaded-intercontinental ballistic missiles targeted at the US west coast, and in 1969 proved its conventional military prowess against the Soviet Union in the clashes on the Ussuri river. China’s all round military heft made it a preferred candidate for Washington to court in order to tilt the balance against Moscow in the Cold War.

Now how exactly do these historical cases fit the purported American intention to build India up into a consequential power? If anything, these cases prove the thesis this analyst has been pegging away at for some 20 years now, which is that first acquiring strategic military wherewithal — especially megaton thermonuclear-ICBM forces — is a prerequisite for India to be perceived as a substantive system "balancer" and to attract powerful friends to achieve this goal. Strategic military weakness in a state only invites derisory deals of the nuclear kind mooted by the US.

This brings us to the state of the nuclear negotiations on the eve of President George W. Bush’s visit. The near hysteria in official circles resembles the tizzy the colonial government was in, as described by James Morris, the most engaging chronicler of the British Empire, before the 1911 Durbar featuring another George — the "King Emperor" George V. It manifests the Indian habit of genuflection, now as then, at its most cringe-inducing. It has led naturally to the US National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley conceiving of the Bush visit in terms of its "function" to "force" or even sweet-talk Dr Singh into, presumably, making concessions on the separation plan.

His February 27 statement in Parliament notwithstanding, the Prime Minister cannot afford to concede any ground whatsoever on four issues, no matter what bait, lure or temptation is dangled by President Bush. For reasons of national security and long term energy independence, India cannot afford to:

1. bring (or ever think of doing so) the fast breeder reactor programme and the follow-on thorium cycle under safeguards now or in the future,

2. agree to a safeguards regime on any reactor or nuclear facility in "perpetuity" — something the US has rejected for its own nuclear installations,

3. allow any even remotely weapons programme-usable nuclear facilities anywhere in the country, and

4. commit the five indigenous power plants under construction (other than the two Russian reactors at Koodankulum, which are safeguards-bound) to international inspection a priori, considering that seven of the currently 11 un-safeguarded dual-use power plants — Manmohan Singh’s "65%" of all active power reactors — are to be brought under international supervision; the most that may be promised is a case-by-case examination depending on the military requirements at the time.

These measures alone will preserve a modicum of manoeuvring room, continuing leverage, and strategic autonomy for the country in the years to come. Bush has also to be reminded that India’s sovereign nuclear interests and policies cannot be fashioned to please either the US Legislature or the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and that he better begin expending his political capital to push this deal, rather than rely on India to do all the heavy lifting.

Bharat Karnad is Professor in National Security Studies at the Centre for Policy Research and author of Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, 2nd Ed.

Kaunteya said...

Why is India Inc so singularly listless. FM says we are estimating 8% growth rate this year and bang ! He is the hero. [What's the big deal with 8% when you inherited the best economy]

The momentum gained in economy during NDA rule is being milked by Congressi FM to the hilt. They will milk the cow and come up with one largesse after another under the garb of Social spending till this cow is terminally ill. Some other government will work overtime to get the economy back on track and one billion idiots will vote that government out only to find another Congressi government ruin the economy and turn the clock back to Nehruvian-Hindu growth rate.

solarpetal said...

kaunteya,
nehruvian-hindu growth rate is inappropriate. u might call it nehruvian-stalinist growth rate.