rajeev in pioneer on yankee enthusiasm for railroading the nuke deal through

nov 6th, 2007

http://www.dailypioneer.com/indexn12.asp?main_variable=EDITS&file_name=edit3%2Etxt&counter_img=3

and given that it disappears off the pioneer's web page, here's the full text:

US needs deal more than us

Rajeev Srinivasan It appears it is the Americans who most fear that the proposed civil nuclear cooperation deal will collapse, if you look at their recent actions. President George W Bush called Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to convey his concern; Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee to urge him to press forward with the deal.

There has been a veritable procession of visiting American worthies who have suddenly developed a deep interest in India. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger threatened dire consequences. India's credibility would suffer greatly, said he. Nobody asked him about the US's credibility after it reneged on the Tarapur nuclear fuel agreement and unilaterally abrogated other treaties.

Mr Kissinger implied that the US would also not support India's quest for a UN Security Council seat. But then, the US has so far supported it with nothing more than faint praise. Mr Kissinger, who sent the US 7th Fleet steaming into the Bay of Bengal to intimidate India in 1971, is now apparently keen to promote India's interests. Very touching, indeed.

Mr Kissinger must be hoping for a reprise of the 'Nixon in China' show that he orchestrated, and expecting 'Bush in India' to be a new Broadway hit. The US opening to China largely benefited the latter; Mr Kissinger is betting that India is easier prey. He knows sweet-talking will get India's politicians to commit collective suicide, as their grasp of our national interests is tenuous.

US Treasury Secretary Henry Poulson, known mostly as a 'friend of China' during his years at Goldman Sachs, also arrived, touting India's charms. Mr Poulson made positive noises about India's economy, and gratuitously mentioned the nuclear agreement. Former US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick, now heading the World Bank, showed up and talked about infrastructure and growth. The media went into overdrive about 'The Gap' and child labour in its sweatshops in India. These are signs of subtle economic pressure: Do our bidding, or else... That is the stick.

The carrot is: The nuclear deal is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for India. It would be foolish to throw this chance away because it will never be offered again; and India will never again have the chance for membership in the official nuclear club.

Why such solicitous concern for India right now? Why is the deal so important, and to whom? Common sense suggests that the party getting the best of the transaction would be most enthusiastic to conclude it. And the US is the very picture of the over-eager suitor.

Most who oppose the deal in India do not object to a strategic alliance with the US. They do object to the non-proliferation jihad, and to the one-sided nature of the agreement: The benefits accrue to the US, and the costs to India. The deal is binding and irrevocable on India, but the US can wriggle out of provisions it does not like now or in the future. India commits, the US weasel-words and airily suggests best-effort.

The agreement in its current form is an absolute steal for the Americans: They get India to 'cap, rollback and terminate'; they reduce India to a protectorate in energy matters, dependent on American whim regarding uranium supplies; and they get to sell their obsolete or untested reactors for billions, and can test them out without risking meltdowns on American soil. Furthermore, all the other restrictions on India, in aerospace and high-technology, remain intact.

This is simply not fair. There is no good reason for India to give up its nuclear research, especially the promising thorium-based fast-breeder technology, or to put 35 of its reactors under intrusive IAEA (read American) inspections when the nuclear powers, the P5, have collectively only put nine of their hundreds of reactors under IAEA controls.

It is also likely that nuclear fission is the energy solution of the past, with its pollution problems and terrorism concerns. New advances, especially in renewable energy areas (the new CIGS technology for thin-film solar panels is particularly notable), may render dirty nuclear fission irrelevant in a decade.

Thus, from an energy point of view, the pact means India is giving up too much; and from a strategic point of view, India is not getting enough. Conversely, the US is getting a tremendous bargain, and reducing a potential superpower rival to a vassal. No wonder Mr Kissinger, Mr Poulson, Mr Zoellick, Mr Nicholas Burns, et al are billing and cooing so much.

Tough negotiation pays dividends, as demonstrated by India's Arundhati Ghose at the UN in the aftermath of Pokhran II: By refusing to be cowed then, India benefited greatly. Another instance of good negotiation was in the contract for the Smart City, a technology park near Kochi in Kerala. The original agreement inked by the former Congress Government with a Dubai firm was a sweetheart deal: The Dubai folks got land and buildings for a small percentage of book value, and they got a monopoly on technology SEZs in the vicinity.

A new, Communist Government, on coming to power, cancelled the arrangement. The Dubai firm hollered bloody murder, and vowed to pack up and leave. However, when the Communists held firm, the Dubai people accepted a new pact, wherein they paid fair value for the real estate, got a lease instead of permanent freehold, and lost any monopoly power. It was still a good deal for the Dubai firm, and they knew it too, and so they signed without further ado.

Americans will come to a similar conclusion as well. It is worthwhile for them to provide further concessions to get the agreement through, because it is still desirable for them to get India into their general orbit, as the rise of a belligerent China threatens all of Asia and the Pacific.

Time is also on India's side. American power is waning, in relative terms, and India's is waxing. It is much like the story of the court poet who infuriated his king by suggesting that the king was the new moon and the emperor was the full moon. Any future deal will see an India that is more demanding, and an America that needs the pact even more. This explains why Americans are pushing the deal through, as their bargaining position will weaken the longer it is delayed.

Bottom line: The Americans need this deal now, and India can, and should, extract its pound of flesh. But after Mr Kissinger met the West Bengal Chief Minister, and Ms Sonia Gandhi met the Chinese, the Communists have notably toned down their rhetoric. Is this the infamous 'November Surprise', with various quid pro quo all over the place?