india as american vassal state and china's prey

aug 5th, 2006

nehru's biggest legacy = losing tibet, the repercussions of which we are still seeing

manmohan singh's biggest legacy = giving away india's strategic crown jewels.

this is what will embolden the chinese to invade. as a couple of readers have pointed out, why are the chinese building a replica of the aksai chin border in northern china? they are using it for war games so that they can then invade.

net result = the chinese will capture india's trans-himalayan regions.

india, which is so frozen with fear even against pakistan's (chinese) screw-driver bombs, will not dare lift a finger as the chinese advance.

prakash karat and sitaram yechuri will be at the border, waiting with marigold garlands, to invite in the invaders.


---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: J

Forwarded messages

[ Subject: And Manmohan Singh is PROUD of this
[ From: "Marcus Aurelius" <aryamihir@hotmail.com>
[ Date: 5 Aug 2006 00:18:15 -0700

So, dear prime minister, tell us again what exactly is
India getting?

http://www.asianage.com/main.asp?layout=2&cat1=1&cat2=22&newsid=239507

Delhi knew US won't lift N-tech curbs   8/4/2006
11:56:24 PM

By Our Correspondent [Asian Age]

New Delhi, Aug. 4: The United States has had no
intention of fully lifting the embargo on civil
nuclear commerce with India despite signing a
much-trumpeted deal on July 18, 2005. And despite
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh having assured
Parliament that the deal opened the way to "full"
civil nuclear cooperation with the US, the Indian
government knew beforehand that Washington would not
transfer enrichment, reprocessing and heavy-water
technologies to India. The government also did not
take Parliament into confidence that under the deal,
in addition to the inspections by the International
Atomic Energy Agency, three US agencies would carry
out end-use verification in India.

These revelations emerged on Wednesday at the US
Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing to confirm
the nomination of Mr John C. Rood as the new assistant
secretary of state for international security and
non-proliferation. The revelations raise the question
whether Dr Singh intentionally misinformed and misled
Parliament on several occasions since signing the
deal. Not only did Dr Singh make no mention of
parallel US end-use verification in any of his
statements in Parliament, but he also has steadfastly
maintained that the deal involved "full civilian
nuclear energy cooperation".

Mr Rood testified: "The administration has been clear
throughout our dealings with the Indians about what
our policy on enrichment and reprocessing technologies
is. In fact, this was an important feature of what we
discussed with the Indians that led up to the July 18,
2005 joint statement."

According to the transcript of the hearing, Senate
committee chairman Richard Lugar quizzed Mr Rood over
the argument of some Indian officials that the
legislative prohibition on the transfer of
reprocessing, enrichment and heavy-water equipment
technologies constituted a shifting of the goalpost.
"Did New Delhi not understand United States policy,
which you've enunciated again this morning? If they
did understand the policy, please give us your opinion
on why they opposed placing the prohibition into law
but can accept the existence of the policy," Mr Lugar
queried.

In his reply, Mr Rood said that while the Indian
government had been clearly told beforehand that the
US will not supply these technologies, the
administration preferred this ban to remain in place
at the policy rather than statutory level.
Incorporating that ban in the enabling legislation,
according to Mr Rood, "singles India out".

"We look forward to civil nuclear cooperation with
India, but we've told the Indian government we don't
envision that cooperation involving enrichment and
reprocessing technologies or the technology for the
production of heavy water," Mr Rood said, adding, "We
would prefer to maintain this practice as a matter of
policy as opposed to a matter of law."

The testimony brought out that the Indian government
not only knew all along that there would be no "full"
nuclear cooperation with the US, but also that it
suppressed this fact from its own Parliament and
agreed to accept restrictive nuclear commerce with the
US. Like the Bush administration, Dr Singh's
government was embarrassed by the Senate and House
bills laying bare the continuing restrictions on
India.

The revelations also expose another charade: both in
the July 18, 2005, deal and the subsequent March 2,
2006 Bush-Singh joint statement in New Delhi, the US
pledged to enable "full civil nuclear cooperation with
India".

Senator Lugar also quizzed Mr Rood on Indian
objections to the requirement in the proposed
legislation for the US to set up, in parallel to the
perpetual IAEA inspections, an end-use monitoring
system to track how India was utilising the exports.

Mr Rood said the administration would have preferred
to use existing verification mechanisms operated by
the US departments of energy and commerce and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, rather than set up an
additional statutory monitoring system about which it
had held no prior discussions with India.

"We would have preferred to rely on these existing
mechanisms as opposed to creating an additional
end-use verification procedure for India. We did not
discuss creation of such a framework with the Indians
during our discussions with them," Mr Rood said,
adding that New Delhi saw the additional monitoring
system "as implying a lack of trust in them and so,
naturally, they have some concerns about that".

What the hearing brought out is that India will have
to accept three parallel inspection systems: one by
the IAEA, another by the three US agencies, and a
third statutory system answerable to the US Congress.
The hearing revealed that New Delhi had quietly
acquiesced to the US three-agency monitoring system,
but expressed its concern when the proposed
legislation brought US end-use verification out in the
open through the requirement for statutory safeguards.

Mr Lugar had asked that if China could agree to
end-use verification, why not India. The 1985 US-China
nuclear accord, however, has no provision for IAEA
inspections on nuclear items and technologies imported
by Beijing. In any case, China accepts only nominal,
voluntary IAEA safeguards on a few facilities, unlike
India, which agreed to permanent, legally irrevocable
international inspections.

Adi Anant

- - - - - - -

[ Subject: No point waiting. India should cut its
losses, and seek partners elsewhere
[ From: "Marcus Aurelius" <aryamihir@hotmail.com>
[ Date: 5 Aug 2006 00:28:20 -0700

[From Asian Age http://www.asianage.com  ]

"... Informed sources here said there was no question
of the final bill being closer to the July 18
agreement because, after the reconciliation, both
Houses of the US Congress will incorporate the common
points in the bills passed by them. Congressmen have
made it very clear since the House adopted the bill
with an overwhelming majority that the support was
based largely on the willingness of the Bush
administration to accommodate the legislators'
concerns. The strong non-proliferation lobby in the US
has also admitted that the bill passed by the House
has addressed most, if not all, issues they had
raised.

Mr McCormack did not spell out what New Delhi was
expected to do, but it is clear that it has to
negotiate the safeguards agreement with the IAEA;
agree to the intrusive additional protocol; complete
the negotiations on what is described as the 123
Agreement with the US; ensure that the Nuclear
Suppliers' Group agrees to the deal; and make sure
that it does little and says nothing controversial
until the Senate, and then the US Congress, vote on
the legislation.

Both bills ensure that India:

Caps its production of fissile material;

Restricts its future nuclear supplies by codifying the
political guidelines of the NSG;

Follows a foreign policy "congruent" with the US of
which the isolation of Iran is an integral part;

Negotiates a safeguards agreement with the IAEA before
the US President takes the final steps to formalise
the nuclear deal even while making it clear that the
safeguards agreement is not India-specific;

Joins the illegal Proliferation Security Initiative;

remains under sanctions on fuel reprocessing,
enrichment and production of heavy water for equipment
and technologies;

Does not get access to the full range of nuclear and
dual-use technologies;

Allows access to IAEA and US inspectors;

Agrees not to conduct nuclear tests;

Allows the US President access to information that
will enable him to report back to the US Congress on
different aspects, including the uranium mined and
utilised, of India's nuclear programme.

These are just some of the common points in both
bills, but each is a departure from the July 18
agreement to which Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has
said the government is committed. Sources here point
out that a majority of the US legislators have
supported the bill in the House just because of these
provisions, and it is highly unlikely that the Senate
will agree to a dilution. BJP leader and former
minister Yashwant Sinha pointed out in the Rajya Sabha
this week: "The Senate bill is even tougher." The
sources said there is little point in Parliament, or
even the government, waiting for the final legislation
as this cannot but be a reconciliation of the two
bills, which differ on some provisions but have found
common ground on the above provisions, and many more
not listed here, that seek to bring India's nuclear
programme and elements of its foreign policy under US
supervision."

Adi Anant