manmohan singh wordsmiths on nuclear stuff: long

aug 19th, 2006

what exactly is going on in the nuke deal? it's increasingly clear indians are being taken to the cleaners, for absolutely no benefit at all.

from a newsgroup that i subscribe to:

===================

Namaskar everyone.

Here is the verbatim text of PM SIngh's speech in Rajya Sabha on
the issue of nuclear deal. On the face of it, it appears that
given country wide protests, the Govt. is backing off, and
becoming more candid on this issue. Earlier, we had even folks
none less than Shyam Saran who argued, rather circuitously, that
the curtailment of n-testing is a price we have to pay if we need
the deal. Point 9, says that any formal legislation in context of
Indian nuclear testing is unacceptable. That is a significant
shift. DItto for may other points which MMS has touched upon.

How do others read this stmt. Is MMS just buying time. Or is it
that protests against the deal, did have an impact. Or is it that
I am being a novice and an optimist.

Regardless, the pressure should not cease. Raise awareness.
Spread the word. Nothing works like awareness.

N

========

'No one can influence policy as long as I am PM'

August 18, 2006 01:05 IST



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Amidst mounting pressure from the Opposition and the Left allies
to explain the government's position regarding the Indo-US
nuclear deal, Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh on Thursday
addressed the Rajya Sabha and answered the concerns raised by
various parties, including the scientific community.

Following is the text of his speech:

At the outset, I would like to convey my gratitude to all the
Hon'ble Members who have participated in this debate. I am
grateful for this opportunity to clarify some of the issues
arising from the discussion. I will do so in a non partisan
spirit and I have every reason to believe that after I have
finished that I will be able to carry the whole House with me.
Our Government has never shied away from a full discussion in
Parliament on this important issue. On three previous occasions
on July 29, 2005, February 27, 2006 and March 7, 2006, I had made
detailed statements and discussed this important subject in this
august House. Once again, several issues have been raised during
the current discussions and I wish to take this opportunity to
respond to them. I also intend to cover developments since my
last suo motu statement of March 7 this year.

Two types of comments have been made during the discussion in the
House. The first set of issues pertains to the basic orientation
of our foreign policy. Some Hon'ble Members have observed that by
engaging in discussions with, and allegedly acquiescing in the
demands made by the United States, we have compromised the
independent nature of our foreign policy.

The second set of issues pertain to deviations from the July 18
Joint Statement and the March 2 Separation Plan. Many of the
points raised by the Hon'ble Members have also been aired outside
Parliament, notably also by some senior members of the scientific
establishment. Overall, a listing of the important concerns
include the following: that the India-US Nuclear initiative and
more particularly the content of the proposed legislation in the
US Congress, could undermine the autonomy of our decision-making;
limit the options or compromise the integrity of our strategic
programme; and adversely affect the future of our scientific
research and development. To sum up, this would suggest that
India's strategic nuclear autonomy is being compromised and India
is allowing itself to be pressurized into accepting new and
unacceptable conditions that are deviations from the commitments
made by me to Parliament in July 2005 and in February and March
this year.

I recognize that many of these concerns are borne out of genuine
conviction that nothing should be done that would undermine long
standing policies that have a bearing on India's vital national
security interests. I fully share and subscribe to these
sentiments. I would like to assure the Hon'ble Members that
negotiations with the US regarding the civilian nuclear deal have
not led to any change in the basic orientation of our policies,
or affected our independent judgment of issues of national
interest. Last year during my visit to the US, I addressed the
National Press Club in the full glare of the media. A question
was put to me regarding what I thought about the US intervention
in Iraq. In the full public glare of the media I said that it was
a mistake. I said the same to President Bush when he visited
India. I said India does not find favour with regime change.

The thrust of our foreign policy remains the promotion of our
national interest. We are unswerving in our commitment to an
independent foreign policy. We do recognize the complexities
present in an increasingly inter-dependent and multi-polar world.
While we recognize that the United States is a pre-eminent power
and good relations with the U.S. are in our national interest,
this has not in any way clouded our judgment. There are many
areas of agreement with the United States, but at the same time
there are a number of areas in which we have differences and we
have not shied away from making these known to the US, as also
expressing them in public. Currently, we are engaged not only
with the US but other global powers like Russia, China, the EU,
UK, France and Japan. We are also focusing on ASEAN, as well as
countries in West Asia, Africa and Latin America. More
importantly, we are devoting proportionately larger time and
effort in building relations with countries in our immediate
neighbourhood like Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar,
and Pakistan. Our relations with all these countries are
determined by the dictates of our enlightened national interest
and we have not allowed any other country, including the United
States, to influence our polices. This will not change as long as
I am Prime Minister.

I would, hence, again reiterate in view of the apprehensions
expressed, that the proposed US legislation on nuclear
cooperation with India will not be allowed to become an
instrument to compromise India's sovereignty. Our foreign policy
is determined solely by our national interests. No legislation
enacted in a foreign country can take away from us that sovereign
right. Thus there is no question of India being bound by a law
passed by a foreign legislature. Our sole guiding principle in
regard to our foreign policy, whether it is on Iran or any other
country, will be dictated entirely by our national interest.

Let me now turn to some of the concerns that have been expressed
on the second set of issues regarding possible deviations from
assurances given by me in this august House on the July 18, 2005
Joint Statement and the March 2, 2006 Separation Plan. I would
like to state categorically that there have neither been nor will
there be any compromises on this score and the Government will
not allow such compromises to occur in the future.

Hon'ble Members will recall that during President Bush's visit to
India in March this year, agreement was reached between India and
the United States on a Separation Plan in implementation of the
India-United States Joint Statement of July 18, 2005. This
Separation Plan had identified the nuclear facilities that India
was willing to offer, in a phased manner, for IAEA safeguards,
contingent on reciprocal actions taken by the United States. For
its part, the United States Administration was required to
approach the US Congress for amending its laws and the Nuclear
Suppliers' Group for adapting its Guidelines to enable full
civilian nuclear cooperation between India and the international
community.

The US Administration had thereafter approached the US Congress
to amend certain provisions of the United States Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, which currently prohibit civil nuclear cooperation
with India. The US House of Representatives International
Relations Committee passed a Bill on the subject on 27th June
2006. The House of Representatives passed the Bill as approved
by its International Relations Committee on July 27.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed its version of the
Bill on June 29, 2006. The US Senate is now expected to vote on
this version of the Bill some time in September. We have
concerns over both the House and Senate versions of the Bill.
Since the two Bills are somewhat different in content, according
to US practice they will need to be reconciled to produce a
single piece of legislation. After adoption by both the House
and the Senate, this would become law when the US President
accords his approval. The final shape of the legislation would,
therefore, be apparent only when the House and the Senate
complete the second stage of assent/adoption.

Meanwhile, the US Government has approached the Nuclear
Suppliers' Group to adapt its guidelines to enable full civil
nuclear cooperation between India and the International
community. In March this year, the NSG at its plenary meeting in
Brazil held a preliminary discussion on this issue. The matter
will be further discussed by the Nuclear Suppliers' Group later
this year. On our part, we have separately raised this issue
with several countries and urged them to lift the existing
restrictions on nuclear supplies to India. I myself have raised
this issue with the Heads of State or Government of Russia,
France, UK, Japan, Germany, Brazil, Norway, Iceland and Cyprus,
among others.

In view of the concerns voiced by the Hon'ble Members, I shall
try to address each of these concerns in some detail. I shall,
however, begin by affirming that our approach is guided by the
understandings contained in the July 2005 Joint Statement and the
March 2006 Separation Plan. What we can agree with the United
States to enable nuclear cooperation must be strictly within
these parameters.

The key provisions to which references have been made in
Parliament and outside are the following:

(i) Full Civil Nuclear Cooperation: The central
imperative in our discussions with the United State on Civil
Nuclear Cooperation is to ensure the complete and irreversible
removal of existing restrictions imposed on India through
iniquitous restrictive trading regimes over the years. We seek
the removal of restrictions on all aspects of cooperation and
technology transfers pertaining to civil nuclear energy â€'
ranging from nuclear fuel, nuclear reactors, to re-processing
spent fuel, i.e. all aspects of a complete nuclear fuel cycle.
This will be the surest guarantee of India's acceptance as a full
and equal partner of the international nuclear community, even
while preserving the integrity of our three stage nuclear
programme and protecting the autonomy of our scientific research
and development. We will not agree to any dilution that would
prevent us from securing the benefits of full civil nuclear
cooperation as amplified above.

(ii) Principle of Reciprocity: I had earlier
assured the House that reciprocity is the key to the
implementation of our understanding contained in the July 2005
Statement. I stand by that commitment. When we put forward the
Separation Plan, we again made it clear to the United States that
India could not be expected to take on obligations such as
placing its nuclear facilities under safeguards in anticipation
of future lifting of restrictions. India and the United States
have held one round of discussions on a proposed bilateral
cooperation agreement. India and the IAEA have held technical
discussions regarding an India-specific Safeguards agreement.
Further discussions are required on both these documents. While
these parallel efforts are underway, our position is that we will
accept only IAEA safeguards on the nuclear facilities, in a
phased manner, and as identified for that purpose in the
Separation Plan only when all nuclear restrictions on India have
been lifted. On July 29 last year, I had stated that before
voluntarily placing our civil nuclear facilities under IAEA
safeguards, we will ensure that all restrictions on India have
been lifted. There has been no shift in our position on this
point.

(iii) Certification: The draft Senate Bill requires
the US President to make an annual report to the Congress that
includes certification that India is in full compliance of its
nonâ€'proliferation and other commitments. We have made it
clear to the United States our opposition to these provisions,
even if they are projected as nonâ€'binding on India, as
being contrary to the letter and spirit of the July Statement. We
have told the US Administration that the effect of such
certification will be to diminish a permanent waiver authority
into an annual one. We have also indicated that this would
introduce an element of uncertainty regarding future cooperation
and is, not acceptable to us.

(iv) India as a State possessing Advanced Nuclear
Technology: Hon'ble Members may recall that the July 18
Statement, had acknowledged that India should be regarded as a
State with advanced nuclear technology enjoying the same
advantages and benefits as other states with advanced nuclear
technology, such as the US. The July Statement did not refer to
India as a Nuclear Weapons State because that has a particular
connotation in the NPT but it explicitly acknowledged the
existence of India's military nuclear facilities. It also meant
that India would not attract fullâ€'scope safeguards such as
those applied to Nonâ€'Nuclear Weapon States that are
signatories to the NPT and there would be no curbs on
continuation of India's nuclear weapon related activities. In
these important respects, India would be very much on par with
the five Nuclear Weapon States who are signatories to the NPT.
Similarly, the Separation Plan provided for an
Indiaâ€'specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA with
assurances of uninterrupted supply of fuel to reactors together
with India's right to take corrective measures in the event fuel
supplies are interrupted. We have made clear to the US that
India's strategic programme is totally outside the purview of the
July Statement, and we oppose any legislative provisions that
Mandate scrutiny of either our nuclear weapons programme or our
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.

(v) Safeguards Agreement and Fuel Assurances: In
this respect too, it is worth emphasizing that the March 2006
Separation Plan provides for an Indiaâ€'Specific Safeguards
Agreement with the IAEA, with assurances of uninterrupted supply
of fuel to reactors that would be placed under IAEA safeguards
together with India's right to take corrective measures in the
event fuel supplies are interrupted. We, of course, have the
sovereign right to take all appropriate measures to fully
safeguard our interests. An important assurance is the commitment
of support for India's right to build up strategic reserves of
nuclear fuel over the lifetime of India's reactors. We have
initiated technical discussions at the expert level with the IAEA
on an Indiaâ€'Specific Safeguards Agreement. Both the
Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with the United States
and the India-Specific Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA would
be only within the parameters of the July Statement and the March
Separation Plan. There is no question of India signing either a
Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA or an Additional Protocol of a
type concluded by Nonâ€'Nuclear Weapons States who have
signed the NPT. We will not accept any verification measures
regarding our safeguarded nuclear facilities beyond those
contained in an India-Specific Safeguards Agreement with the
IAEA. Therefore there is no question of allowing American
inspectors to roam around our nuclear facilities.

(vi) Integrity and reliability of our strategic
programme � autonomy of decision-making and future
scientific research and development: In my statement of March 7,
2006, I had assured Parliament that the Separation Plan would not
adversely affect our strategic programme. I reiterate that
commitment today. The Separation Plan has been so designed as to
ensure adequacy of fissile material and other inputs for our
strategic programme, based on our current and assessed future
needs. The integrity of our 3â€'Stage nuclear programme will
not be affected. The autonomy of our Research and Development
activity, including development of our fast breeder reactors and
the thorium programme, in the nuclear field will remain
unaffected. We will not accept interference by other countries
vis-�-vis the development of our strategic programme. We
will not allow external scrutiny of our strategic programme in
any manner, much less allow it to be a condition for future
nuclear cooperation between India and the international
community.

(vii) Moratorium on production of fissile material:
Our position on this matter is unambiguous. We are not willing to
accept a moratorium on the production of fissile material. We are
only committed to negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty in
the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, a commitment given by
the previous government. India is willing to join only a
nonâ€'discriminatory, multilaterally negotiated and
internationally verifiable FMCT, as and when it is concluded in
the Conference on Disarmament, again provided our security
interests are fully addressed.

(viii) Nonâ€'discriminatory Global Nuclear
Disarmament: Our commitment towards non-discriminatory global
nuclear disarmament remains unwavering, in line with the Rajiv
Gandhi Action Plan. There is no dilution on this count. We do not
accept proposals put forward from time to time for regional
nonâ€'proliferation or regional disarmament. Pending global
nuclear disarmament, there is no question of India joining the
NPT as a nonâ€'nuclear weapon state, or accepting
fullâ€'scope safeguards as a requirement for nuclear
supplies to India, now or in the future.

(ix) Cessation of Future Cooperation: There is
provision in the proposed US law that were India to detonate a
nuclear explosive device, the US will have the right to cease
further cooperation. Our position on this is unambiguous. The US
has been intimated that reference to nuclear detonation in the
India-US Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement as a condition
for future cooperation is not acceptable to us. We are not
prepared to go beyond a unilateral voluntary moratorium on
nuclear testing as indicated in the July Statement. The same is
true of other intrusive nonâ€'proliferation benchmarks that
are mentioned in the proposed US legislation. India's possession
and development of nuclear weapons is an integral part of our
national security. This will remain so.

Hon'ble Members will appreciate the fact that an international
negotiation on nuclear energy cooperation particularly when it
involves dismantling restrictive regimes that have lasted for
over three decades is a complex and sensitive exercise. What we
are attempting today is to put in place new international
arrangements that would overturn three decades of iniquitous
restrictions. It is inevitable, therefore, that there would be
some contradictory pulls and pressures. This does not mean that
India will succumb to pressures or accept conditions that are
contrary to its national interests.

I had personally spoken to President Bush in St. Petersburg last
month on this issue, and conveyed to him that the proposed US
legislation must conform strictly to the parameters of the July
18, 2005 Statement and the March 2, 2006 Separation Plan. This
alone would be an acceptable basis for nuclear cooperation
between India and the United States. India cannot, and is not
prepared to, take on additional commitments outside this agreed
framework or allow any extraneous issues to be introduced. I have
received an assurance from the US President that it was not his
intention to shift goalposts, and that the parameters of the
scope of cooperation would be those contained in the July 2005
Joint Statement and the March 2006 Separation Plan. A White House
Statement of Administration Policy of July 26, 2006 recognizes
some, though not all, of India's concerns, and conveyed that the
Administration has voiced them with the Congress.

I can assure you that there is no ambiguity in our position in so
far as it has been conveyed to the US. The US is aware of our
position that the only way forward is strict adherence to July
Statement and March Separation Plan. I am hopeful that the
bilateral Indiaâ€'US Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
when concluded will take into account the issues raised here.
However, I must be honest and frank that I cannot predict with
certainty the final form of the US legislation or the outcome of
this process with the NSG, which consists of 45 countries with
divergent views. We are hopeful that this will lead in a
direction wherein our interests are fully protected and that
there is a complete lifting of restrictions on India that have
existed for three decades. Such an outcome if it materializes
will contribute to our longâ€'term energy security by
enabling a rapid increase in nuclear power. It would lead to the
dismantling of the technology denial regimes that have hampered
our development particularly in hiâ€'tech sectors. I will
have wide consultations including with the members of the Atomic
Energy Commission, the nuclear and scientific communities and
others to develop a broad based national consensus on this
important matter. I wish to inform members of the House that I
have invited members of the Atomic Energy Commission on the 26th
August for a meeting. That same day I have also invited the group
of distinguished scientists who have expressed concerns to meet
me.

Finally, I would only like to state that in keeping with our
commitments to Parliament and the nation, we will not accept any
conditions that go beyond the parameters of the July 18, 2005
Joint Statement and the March 2, 2006 Separation Plan, agreed to
between India and the United States. If in their final form the
US legislation or the adapted NSG Guidelines impose extraneous
conditions on India, the Government will draw the necessary
conclusions, consistent with the commitments I have made to
Parliament.