From the mailbox: Indo-US nuclear deal: An American nonproliferation zealot's distorted view

dec 23rd

this proliferation ayatollah thinks the us is giving up too much to india.

i think india is giving up too much to the us.

we can agree that the deal as written is a bad idea.

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: B

Can U.S. defend nuclear deal with India?

William C. Potter Special to The Daily Yomiuri

The decision by the administration of U.S . President George W. Bush in mid-July to embrace India as a partner in nuclear-energy cooperation has been characterized as bold or reckless depending upon the relative importance one attaches to containing China or restraining the spread of nuclear weapons. What both critics and proponents of the new initiative tend to agree on is that the U.S.-India nuclear deal signals a major departure from prior U.S. nonproliferation behavior.

Although the policy shift appears to have been conceived and adopted in a top-down fashion that entailed minimal interagency review and gave little weight to arms control considerations, the reorientation is consistent with the following four principles that gradually have come to govern Washington's approach to nonproliferation.

-- Nuclear proliferation is inevitable; at best it can be managed not prevented. According to this perspective, although the pace of nuclear weapons has been much slower than predicted, we are approaching a new tipping point in which a number of states may "go nuclear." U.S. policy to counter proliferation must be selective. In those instances in which the United States cannot prevent nuclear weapons spread, it can and should seek to influence the development of responsible nuclear policies on the part of new nuclear nations. This principle applies to the Indian subcontinent, the nuclearization of which should have been anticipated and cannot be reversed.

-- There are good proliferators and bad proliferators. Throughout most of the post-World War II era U.S. declaratory policy opposed the spread of nuclear weapons without regard to the political orientation of the state in question. In recent years, however, it has been replaced by a more differentiated policy that distinguishes between U.S. friends and foes. This policy change has meant applying higher standards for nonproliferation compliance to selected states and discounting the proliferation risks posed by others. In addition, it has had the effect of recasting the nature of the proliferation challenge from "dangerous weapons" to "evil regimes." India is an example of a "good proliferator" that subscribes to democratic norms. It also has demonstrated responsible nuclear export policies.

-- Multilateral mechanisms to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons are ineffectual. The Bush administration consistently has exhibited a strong preference for foreign and military tools that are unconstrained by the need to seek approval from international organizations or multilateral bodies be they the U.N. Security Council or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This general orientation applies with equal force to the nonproliferation sphere and was in evidence at the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference in May and the U.N. Summit in September, neither of which produced a single recommendation relating to nonproliferation or disarmament. Although Washington had attached greater importance to the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group as a means to curtail the spread of uranium enrichment technology, it is prepared to weaken that body in pursuit of a strategic partnership with India.

-- Regional security considerations trump those of global nonproliferation. Diplomats have long struggled with the problem of how best to enhance nuclear stability in South Asia without appearing to reward those few states not party to the NPT. The U.S.-India nuclear deal essentially resolves the dilemma by ignoring how other states may interpret the repudiation by the United States of existing domestic law and international political obligations regarding nuclear trade with a non-NPT state that also possesses nuclear weapons. It does so because of a determination by the architects of the new India policy that international political objectives take precedence over nonproliferation considerations. A central premise of this policy is that a substantial Indian nuclear arsenal will serve U.S. interests in Asia in the future vis-a-vis a more assertive and powerful China.

It is premature to render a verdict on the longer-term impact of the U.S.-India nuclear deal on regional stability in Asia or global nonproliferation. Most observers agree, however, that the potential benefits for U.S. national security, as well as the possible negative repercussions, will depend heavily on two factors: the extent to which the July expression of common values and practices represents an enduring convergence of national interests between Washington and New Delhi, and the ability of the international community to sustain support for universal nonproliferation principles while applying them selectively. Early indications are not encouraging on either count.

Much to Washington's chagrin, New Delhi has had to be pulled kicking and screaming into the Western-oriented coalition that has condemned Iran's nuclear policies and has advocated referral of the matter to the U.N. Security Council. At the last moment, for example, India joined the U.S.-led resolution on Iran at the September meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, but only after the United States warned its new strategic partner that its abstention would jeopardize congressional support for U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation. India also has balked at committing to a halt in the production of fissile material for military purposes. Even on the issue of shaping the rise of Chinese military power--the core factor driving the change in U.S. policy toward India--it is by no means clear that there is a convergence of perceptions of the Chinese threat or the preferred strategies for coping with the perceived challenge.

In principle, it may be possible to maintain support for universal nonproliferation goals while seeking exceptions in very special cases. In practice, however, there is little reason to believe that one can reconcile these positions. Already Iranian nuclear negotiators have exploited the inconsistency of U.S. efforts to deny enrichment technology to a nonnuclear weapon state party to the NPT while supporting nuclear trade with a non-NPT state that has an overt nuclear weapons program. The tenuous logic of the new U.S. position also has not been lost on those members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group such as Russia and France, who have long advocated loosening nuclear export guidelines, and eagerly have endorsed the Bush proposal. Today they advocate a special exception for India. Will the United States be as comfortable with the exceptions based on that precedent they propose tomorrow?

The outcome of the new U.S.-India deal may be less momentous than either the critics or proponents of the shift in policy allege. However, the most likely outcome also may be the worst. By its nuclear energy embrace of India, the United States already has devalued the benefits of NPT membership and demonstrated that it regards proliferation to be not necessarily a bad thing. Meanwhile, the domestic repercussions of forcing an unnatural alignment of Indian and U.S. policies on Iran actually may undercut prospects for an enduring strategic partnership between a leader of the nonaligned movement and the one remaining superpower.

Potter is institute professor and director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California. He contributed this article in response to Ramesh Thakur's article "U.S.-India nuclear accord a win-win outcome for all" (Nov. 27, Commentary).

(Dec. 9, 2005)