a blue-water navy is a must. we have an edge over china at the moment, but of course the UPA wants us to lose that by underinvesting.
raman's article (i think someone posted it here before) is eye-opening. i didnt know of chinese ports in sri lanka and burma (other than the cocos islands). they have also tried to rent an island from the maldives. they are certainly encircling us. this is why i am so glad that the japanese are holding exercises with the indian navy. two can play at this game.
america should also be worried about china's naval growth.
but all things considered, i appreciate the chinese strategic approach to controlling the sea-lanes. whereas in india all they want to do is to appease mohammedans, as though this had a ghost of a chance as a long-term strategy.
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Yash
Oceanic insecurity
A budgetary shift favouring the Navy would have warned China, says N.V.Subramanian.
Overall, circumstances permit the steady de-privileging of the IAF to expand the Navy to face up to Chinese and other challenges. Since the end of the Cold War, conflicts have by and large localized in the Indian Ocean littoral and hinterland. Weeks from now, US and Nato forces will likely confront the Taliban/ Al-Qaeda spring offensive, and defeat or victory on either side will impact on the Persian/ Arab Middle East all the way to Africa. It is something of a miracle that energy supplies from the region have not irreparably suffered from the Iraq War, although US hostilities against Iran would destroy this immunity.
US involvement in the Indian Ocean region will increase and not lessen and there will be the added weight of its new Africa combatant command, AFRICOM, fast-tracked because of Chinese forays in Africa, although the Bush administration's accent about AFRICOM is to give it a military diplomatic thrust in aid of the US state department and agencies like USAID. But cumulatively, American presence will grow, and this could conceivably draw in powers inclined towards multipolarity, like Russia.
...
India's Maritime Doctrine published in mid-2004 already accounts for power rivalry in the Indian Ocean. It says the "unfolding events consequent to the war in Afghanistan has brought the threats emanating on our Western shores into sharp focus. The growing US and western presence and deployment of naval forces, the battle for oil dominance and its control in the littoral and hinterland…are factors that are likely to have a long-term impact on the overall security environment in the [Indian Ocean region]." The Doctrine also asserts that "the growing assertion of fundamentalist militancy fueled by jihadi fervour are factors that are likely to have a long-term impact on the overall security environment in the [Indian Ocean region]".
India's future naval capability, therefore, has to address these doctrinal concerns, transforming power rivalries in the Indian Ocean, the jihadi/ piratic and sometimes rouge state threats to energy supplies and sea lines of communication, and it has to shoulder much of the weight of the country's strategic force. With the exception of perhaps Pakistan (but increasingly less so), most states in the Indian Ocean littoral and hinterland accept India as the "heir of the British Raj" in terms of its "natural influence" extending to the distant shores of the Indian Ocean. As an American scholar puts it, the Indian Ocean is the "world's only region and ocean named after a single state".
In natural progression from this, it would be in order for the Indian Navy to create a third combatant command, the Indian Ocean Command, and in keeping with its image as the "heir to the Raj", it must also have to project power through the standard means of carrier strike groups. In the medium term, the Navy should option for at least four, fully loaded strike groups, and simultaneously add stand-alone tactical/ strategic submarine assets.
At any cost, India has to build its own nuclear submarines with the capability to launch, submerged, any and all types of missiles, from the BrahMos and Sagarika (if it happens) to nuclear IRBMs. While BrahMos is cost-effective because it is locally produced and good in its class, it is risky to depend on one missile type because it would be read, understood and likely countered by rival navies.
...deleted( N.V.Subramanian is Editor, Newsinsight.net )
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHINA'S STRATEGIC TRIANGLE
-- By B. Raman
Very few would have heard of Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Sitwe (Akyab) in Myanmar before 2002. These were essentially fishing harbours used by the fishermen of these countries. Sometimes, there used to be references to these places in articles on fishing rights, but rarely in articles on possible threats to India's national security. Since 2002, studies on maritime security have started making references to these places. Initially, the focus was on Gwadar. Now, it is also on Hambantota. In the months to come, it will be on Sitwe too.
... deleted
3. China's economic and strategic interest in Gwadar and Sitwe is obvious. It is worried over the possibility of disruptions in the movement of oil and gas tankers to China from the Gulf and Africa through the Malacca Straits due to attacks by pirates and/or terrorists. It wants to reduce its dependence on the Malacca Straits for the movement of its oil and gas supplies. It, therefore, makes eminent sense for it to develop alternate routes. It has prepared two contingency plans for this. Under the first plan, some of the oil and gas tankers will go to Gwadar and from there the supplies will be sent to Xinjiang by pipelines via Pakistani territory, including Kashmiri territory under the occupation of Pakistan. The second plan envisages sending some of the supplies to Yunnan by pipelines from Sitwe.
4. In addition to reducing the vulnerability of energy supplies, Gwadar would also serve as an outlet for the external trade of Xinjiang and the neighbouring provinces of China. Sitwe would serve as an outlet for the external trade of Yunnan and the neighbouring areas. Pakistan has also agreed to let China set up a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Gwadar, exclusively for the use of Chinese industries manufacturing goods for export to Africa. The manufacturing and transport costs would be less if these industries are located in Gwadar instead of in China. There is presently no proposal for a similar SEZ in Sitwe.
5. The Chinese interest in Gwadar is not just economic and energy supplies related. It is much, much more. It is of immense interest to its Navy---as a port of call, as a refuelling halt and as a listening and watch tower to monitor developments in the Gulf---particularly the movements of the US Navy.
7. Pakistan's interest in having Gwadar developed as a major international port and a naval base dates back to 1971. The successful raids by the Indian Navy into the Karachi port during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 made the Pakistani military planners realise the folly of over-dependence on Karachi. Their plans for developing Gwadar into a naval base, which would give a strategic depth to their Navy, were drawn up in the years after the war. These plans did not have an economic component at the time they were drawn up. The economic component was integrated into the plans only after the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of its Central Asian provinces as independent States. The economic component of the integrated plans provided for the construction of an international port, which could serve as an outlet for the external trade of the Central Asian Republics, Afghanistan and the Xinjiang region of China. The military component provided for the construction of a naval base, which would provide a strategic depth to the Pakistani Navy.
... deleted
No comments:
Post a Comment