krepon: Avoiding One Pitfall in U.S.-India Relations (ah, roll over and play dead, right?)

jul 17th, 2009

so far as i can tell, krepon has been one of the big anti-india propagandists.

the clear sub-text: 'cap, rollback and eliminate' is the yankee mantra yesterday, today and tomorrow. india does not deserve to have nukes. but china and pak deserve to.

given the quality of 'leadership' (patsy-dom) demonstrated by UPA II in sharm-el-sheikh, he may be right that it is a great risk if india were to have nukes.

on the other hand, it would interfere with china's and obama's plans:
a) to 'teach india another lesson'
b) to declare victory in afghanistan and go home

very interesting comment by ghostwriter re china's plans: (sorry for repost on blog, bcc:ing some others):

Most scholars, starting with Roderick McFarquhar are agreed that China brilliantly timed its last attack on India to coincide with the Cuban missile crisis. because the Soviets (our ostensible allies) were busy sorting out their own problem, it prevented them from lending India a helping hand in our conflict.

This history is very relevant today. Bharat Verma has raised the alarm on a Chinese attack – in addition one has to ask – will China attack India as soon as 'surge, bribe and run' is completed in Af-Pak?

Consider the favorable circumstance
1. The Yanks (another of our ostensible allies – we have a lot of them) will be busy sorting out the economic mess, for which they need Chinese help
2. The Yanks will want to gracefully 'surge, bribe and run' out of Afghan theatre, for which they need Pak's help. Once they have run away they will outsource Afghan and Kashmir policy to the bearded Pak army – both regular and baggy trouser
3. For reasons 1 and 2 above – the Yanks will not be able to help us
4. The economic crisis has created a mass of testosterone-crazed, newly unemployed Han men – that have to be re-direct to some kind of violent enterprise
5. There is another spineless wimp neo-Nehru in the Indian PM's chair. Meet the new boss, same as the old boss etc.
6. there is a stealth Sino-Mohammedan candidate in charge of the 'free world'
7. Only last year, the ever perfidious Albion – had a change of heart regarding China's position in Tibet. err ….by the way – this may legally invalidate India's claims to it's north-east
8. The number of Malayali advisor's in the defense establishment is the same as 1962

it is – to use a Churchillian phrase – a Gathering Storm

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Michael  Krepon <mk@stimson.org>
Date: Fri, Jul 17, 2009 at 3:10 AM
Subject: Avoiding One Pitfall in U.S.-India Relations
To:




Avoiding One Pitfall in U.S.-India Relations



By Michael Krepon and Samuel Black



The L'Aquila Statement on Non-Proliferation, released at the end of
the G-8 Summit in Italy, received little notice – except in India.
Some in New Delhi took exception to one paragraph of the communiqué
that called on the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to make further
progress "on mechanisms to strengthen controls on transfers" of
enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies.



The Government of India has argued that the civil nuclear cooperation
agreement negotiated with the Bush administration and its subsequent
endorsement by the NSG permits such transfers to India.  As long as
the transferred enrichment and reprocessing equipment is solely
dedicated to peaceful uses, New Delhi argues, it should be provided
along with nuclear power reactors and fuel deliveries.



As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visits India, it would be
unfortunate if this issue becomes a source of contention between
Washington and New Delhi.  The public record of the civil nuclear
cooperation agreement between the United States and India is quite
clear that the transfer of ENR technologies was not part of the deal
endorsed by Congress and signed into law by President Bush:



·        In responses provided to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee in November, 2005, Under Secretary of State Bob Joseph
stated, "We do not intend to provide enrichment and reprocessing
technology to India.  As the President said in February 2004,
'enrichment and reprocessing are not necessary for nations seeking to
harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.' We do not currently
provide enrichment and reprocessing equipment to any country."



·        In April 2006, Senator Lugar sought reaffirmation of this
policy from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who did so,
answering, "Thus, it was stated, without any qualifications or
reservations, that the United States would not export such
technologies to India."



·        The "Hyde Act," in which the House and Senate agreed to waive
certain restrictions on nuclear commerce with India, contained
restrictions in Section 104 (d)(4) on certain types of commerce:
"exports, re-exports, transfers, and re-transfers to India related to
enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water production." These
restrictions can only be waived if onerous provisions are satisfied.



·        The House Foreign Affairs Committee Report endorsing civil
nuclear commerce with India included the following language: "Because
the processes of enriching uranium or separating plutonium for
peaceful or military purposes are essentially identical, they
inherently pose an enhanced risk of proliferation, even under strict
international inspections… In addition, the Committee notes that it is
well-established policy of the United States not to transfer sensitive
nuclear technology, including reprocessing or enrichment technology,
to any state… The Committee finds that no part of this legislation
should be interpreted to allow for any exceptions to this policy."



·        The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report endorsing civil
nuclear commerce with India reinforced this message: "The Committee
believes that the United States must work with other nations to
prevent the export of potentially harmful technologies.  NSG
guidelines are not as strict as they ought to be regarding exports of
enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technology, and the
Committee supports the administration's efforts to achieve consensus
on tightening those guidelines."



·        President Bush's transmittal letter to Congress of the 123
(Implementation) Agreement for the U.S.–India civil nuclear
cooperation agreement included the following language: "Sensitive
nuclear technology, heavy water production technology and production
facilities, sensitive nuclear facilities, and major critical
components of such facilities may not be transmitted under the
Agreement unless the Agreement is amended."



The Obama administration is not departing from the Bush
administration's position on ENR; nor did the recent G-8 statement
break new ground on this subject.  The 2004 G-8 Summit communiqué
stated that enhanced International Atomic Energy Agency inspections of
all national nuclear facilities must be a precondition of ENR
transfers:  "The Additional Protocol must become an essential new
standard in the field of nuclear supply arrangements.  We will work to
strengthen NSG guidelines accordingly."



The reasons for such a clear and consistent U.S. policy toward ENR
transfers are compelling, and have become even more so with
developments in Iran and North Korea.



India is a responsible nation possessing advanced nuclear
technologies.  Iran and North Korea, in stark contrast, have violated
numerous Security Council resolutions regarding their nuclear
programs, including those related to enrichment and reprocessing.
Success in dealing with North Korea and Iran requires, inter alia,
strengthened global norms against transferring ENR technologies.
Global norms matter because they increase leverage against bad actors.
 Global norms are weakened when the United States or any other nuclear
supplier seeks permissive rules for friends.



Moreover, the pursuit of ENR technologies by India comes at an awkward
time.  India is one of a handful of countries that has not signed the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and one of a very small number of
states that is increasing its stocks of bomb-making material and
growing its nuclear arsenal.



India has the sovereign right to test more nuclear weapons, produce
more bomb-making fissile material and build up its stockpile of
nuclear weapons.  The United States and members of the NSG have a
sovereign right not to provide states with nuclear technologies of
particular sensitivity.



The Obama administration is unlikely to reverse the Bush
administration's policy on this issue.  New Delhi can push on many
open doors for improved cooperation and trade with the United States.
Why push on one that isn't open?

Michael Krepon is the co-founder of the Stimson Center and the author
of Better Safe than Sorry, The Ironies of Living with the Bomb
(Stanford University Press, 2009). Samuel Black is a Research
Associate at the Stimson Center.