i find the puerileness and banality of these "analyses" mind-numbing. i thought only steven cohen was capable of these, but clearly he has a bunch of acolytes.
the yanks have been "giving" to pakistan for years, and see where it got them.
the kkkangress has been "giving" to pakistan for years, and see where it got them.
it's time to turn the record over, and stop giving. start sending some bullets. and start taking. for instance, take their nukes.
if i understand correctly, this commentary is derived from the axiom, "a strong, peaceful and united pakistan is good for india". wrong. a weak, chaotic and broken-up pakistan is good for india, because then the baluchis, sindhis, pashtuns etc will be quite happy to attack the punjabis. and leave the rest of us alone.
incidentally, there was an earthquake yesterday in baluchistan that killed at least 200 people, but i don't see the sob-sister pals of pakistan eagerly rushing to offer aid. it's only when punjabis are killed that everybody's bothered.
From: Brahma Chellaney
From: Stanley Weiss [mailto:sweiss@bens.org]
Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2008 7:52 PM
To: Stanley Weiss
Subject: FYI: Stanley A. Weiss and Maharajakrishna Rasgotra Op-Ed
|
Wednesday, October 29, 2008
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| Pakistan and Afghanistan: The Enemy is Not India By Maharajakrishna Rasgotra and Stanley A. Weiss
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| NEW DELHI—The road to stability in Afghanistan, it is now clear, runs through Pakistan—specifically the tribal areas that Taliban and al Qaeda fighters use as a sanctuary. Less understood is that the road to stability in the tribal areas, and across the region, also runs through India.
Old fears of India, with which Pakistan has fought three wars since their 1947 partition, are at the root of much of today's dangerous Pakistani behavior. Islamabad's long-running goal of achieving "strategic depth" with a compliant Afghanistan lingers in elements of its army and powerful spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and their support to anti-Afghan Islamic militants.
Even now, with those militants turning their guns on the Pakistani government and with Pakistani forces engaged in a long-overdue offensive in the tribal areas, most of Pakistan's military remains deployed in the east—toward India and disputed Kashmir.
The result? When American officials recently pressed Pakistan's army chief Ashfaq Kayani to be more aggressive in the tribal areas, he claimed, according to Newsweek, that he lacked the military capability to confront several sizable insurgent strongholds at once.
Islamabad's fears of India are surpassed only by its fears of ethnic disintegration. Many of its ethnic parts, cobbled together like so many other post-colonial states, have never accepted Punjabi domination of the government and military, which—unlike in India—has prevented the emergence of stable federal structure of more or less equal, autonomous units.
Indeed, among Islamabad's greatest worries is that the tens of millions of Pashtuns on either side of the border with Afghanistan could realize their ancient dreams of an independent Pashtunistan. Islamabad therefore misreads Indian efforts to promote security and economic development in Afghanistan, including New Delhi's massive $1 billion reconstruction program, as attempts to isolate or encircle Pakistan. The answer from Pakistani-backed militants? This summer's deadly suicide bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul.
If old Pakistani fears of India are key to understanding Pakistani behavior toward Afghanistan, then removing those fears is key to changing that behavior.
As the dominant political and economic power in the region, India should take the lead. New Delhi should continue to assure Islamabad that India's only objective is a truly independent, united, stable and drug-free Afghanistan.
Specifically, India could offer credible assurances of the security of Pakistan's eastern frontier, explore mutual force reductions on that frontier and unilaterally open its borders—including the Line of Control that divides Kashmir—to tariff-free trade.
For its part, Islamabad must recognize that a stable Afghanistan to its west and a friendly India to the east will help prevent a catastrophic implosion in Pakistan. Finally assured of a secured eastern frontier with India, Pakistan should build on its recent offensive and deploy enough troops in the west to secure the border with Afghanistan, followed by extensive investments in education and development in the tribal regions.
Islamabad should put an end to financing, arming, training and infiltrating terrorists into Kashmir and other parts of India. This would pave the way for other confidence-building steps—visits of senior military leaders, free trade and joint economic ventures.
The United States could help allay any lingering fears in Islamabad by endorsing Indian assurances of the integrity of Pakistan's eastern frontier. More broadly, Washington should support Pakistan's fragile democracy by focusing aid on economic and social development rather than the military.
With Pakistan finally assured that India no longer poses a threat, India could then consider a truly historic step worthy of a great and growing power—contributing military forces to stabilizing Afghanistan. Such a deployment would require a joint request from Kabul, Washington and the United Nations. Indian training teams could play a critical role in strengthening the Afghan military and police.
Reconciliation between Pakistan and India and the presence of Indian forces in Afghanistan may seem illusory. But the return of civilian government in Islamabad gives new hope. If attention can be focused on the real and growing terrorist threat to the region—not those imagined in Islamabad—then fear and loathing in Pakistan could finally give way to trust and cooperation in Afghanistan.
Maharajakrishna Rasgotra, a former foreign secretary of India, is president of the Observer Research Foundation, a think tank in New Delhi. Stanley A. Weiss is founding chairman of Business Executives for National Security, a nonpartisan organization based in Washington. |
1 comment:
"Old fears of India, with which Pakistan has fought three wars since their 1947 partition..."
Surely a mistake?
Should be: "Old fears of India, which Pakistan has attacked three times since their 1947 partition..."
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