Saturday, September 20, 2014

Fwd: The Meaning of Latest Chinese Transgression in Ladakh, Ahead of Chinese President’s Visit to India+Chinese footprint in India+Tibet: the Real Issue


---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: sanjeev nayyar


Any deal with China that involves legally giving Aksai Chin or COK to the Chinese would require prior approval of the J&K State Government since the area formed part of the Princely State of J&K which became part of India thru the Instrument of Accession.
 
 
2. Chinese footprint in India 19/9/14 – gives full details of Chinese business presence and imports by China. If u want PDF file can mail u. http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/chinese-footprint-in-india-114091900036_1.htm
 
3. The Meaning of Latest Chinese Transgression in Ladakh, Ahead of Chinese President's Visit to India by d s rajan 18/9/14 http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1617. MUST READ
'The following post-1997 data, given in chronological order could be relevant to what has been said above: Gives details of each intrusion. To understand the framework, what the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Xi Jinping said (Speech delivered at a party Politburo Study session convened on 28 January 2013) are important. He declared that "China will never pursue its development at the cost of sacrificing interests of other countries …. We will never give up our legitimate rights and will never sacrifice our national core interests. No country should presume that we will engage in trade involving our core interests or that we will swallow the 'bitter fruit' of harming our sovereignty, security or development interests". India therefore needs to obtain official clarification from China whether the PRC accepts Ladakh as part of India. There is a possibility that the intrusions can expand further and lead to a India-China 'local war'. Border talks could go on endlessly, but China cannot be expected to shed its consistent claim on the entire Arunachal Pradesh, being called by it as 'Southern Tibet'. India's response should therefore be based on a long term strategy aimed at strengthening its defence preparedness against any Chinese misadventure. India-China trust deficit still persists due to the issues dividing them strategically; suffice to point out that in the background of their different strategic outlook, New Delhi and Beijing may face an uphill task in establishing mutual trust. - See more at: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1617#sthash.11k1Y2NR.dpuf
 
4. Tibet: the Real Issue by maj gen sheru thapilyal 2007 art republished 18/9/14 http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/tibet-the-real-issue/
'Historically Tibet has never been a province of China. It has been autonomous over the centuries. China had loose control over it under Manchu Tributary system similar to the one it exercised over Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan where their rulers paid tribute to China and possessed Chinese official rank. Not many people may be aware that in AD 763, Tibet conquered large parts of Western China and the then Emperor of China was forced to marry Princess Wencheng to the Tibetan King Song Tsnen Gam Po.
Around the ninth century, Tibet came under Buddhist influence and by the thirteenth century, almost entire Tibet converted to Buddhism. The hand that held the sword was now supporting a prayer wheel. The concept of the Dalai Lama, which was Mongolian in origin, also came into being during this time. Tibet's troubles seem to have started with the Lama getting used to ruling with foreign support.
By the beginning of the twentieth century Tibet had become the Great Game pawn between China, Britain and Russia. On the pretext of sending a trade mission to Tibet, British troops entered Tibet, resulting in the conclusion of a Treaty in 1904 between Tibet and Britain. Obviously the Treaty was concluded on unequal terms. China played the role of a bystander totally ignoring her responsibility, if any. The treaty was bilateral and clearly signified the independent status of Tibet. The Manchu court refused to countersign the Treaty as it failed to recognize Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. On protracted negotiations, China concluded a treaty in 1906 with Great Britain which prevented Tibet from concluding direct negotiations with any foreign power without the consent of China.
From this geo-political perspective, the building of a road through the Aksai Chin area gained salience. The road through Aksai Chin area comprised one of the three main routes to Tibet from the rest of China. It was also a route which was open year-round and least hazardous and in turns also least expensive. Therefore, control of Aksai Chin was perceived as essential in Chinese strategy to control the whole of Tibet.
Tibet and Tibetan ethnic areas are endowed with the greatest river system in the world. Its rivers supply fresh water to 85% of Asia's population and approximately 50% of the world's population.
It may be noted that China uses the Tibetan plateau for the development of its nuclear bombs.
Chinese cannot accept Indian claims to Aksai Chin since the strategic Western Highway passes through it and captured area provides depth to the Western Highway. The point to note here is that after the 1962 War the Chinese withdrew from Eastern Sector, but, not from Ladakh.
In the Eastern Sector, if the Chinese agree to the Mc Mahon Line as the boundary, it will amount to a tacit admission that in 1914, Tibet was an independent country which negotiated the Mc Mahon Line with the British. This weakens the entire Chinese case that Tibet has always been a part of China. China cannot afford to grant autonomy to Tibet since its Western provinces, especially the ones with Muslim majority may seek the same status. This may become the trigger for break up of China one day.
 
5. What China must do to get India on the silk route by dr rahul mishra 17/9/14 http://www.rediff.com/news/column/what-china-must-do-to-get-india-on-silk-route/20140917.htm
'At the substantive level, however, MSR is conceptualised to serve two purposes: to re-energise relations with neighbours through effective use of naval diplomacy and; to respond to the US' rebalancing towards Asia in diplomatic terms. '

6. Great Game South Asia – dangerous portends by lt gen prakash katoch 17/9/14 http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/great-game-south-asia-dangerous-portends/
 
7. China to import more from India to balance trade 19/9/14 by Xinhua http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/882185.shtml
 
8. China India agree to cooperate in the Railway sector 18/9/14 http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/882184.shtml
 
9. Chinese dream is closely tied to dream of India 19/9/14 http://english.people.com.cn/n/2014/0918/c90883-8784575.html
 
Warm Regards
sanjeev nayyar
https://twitter.com/sanjeev1927
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