Defense & Nuclear Deals: Some recent media articles of interest (03/16/08

mar 24th, 2008

the truth about what's really going on on behind the scenes with the nuke and other deals: india is getting screwed.

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From: mita

FYI

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Date: Sun, 16 Mar 2008 13:58:06 -0400
From: (03/16/08)
To: ;

FYI: Here are a few recent media reports on the issues :-

 

A) US clauses restrict India from using warship

Vishal Thapar / CNN-IBN ; ibnlive.com, Mar 15, 2008

 

B) N-deal: The truth Talbott hides
 Brahma Chellaney; Asian Age, Mar 15, 2008

 

C) Nuclear dilemma: The road ahead
A N Prasad ; March 14, 2008; rediff.com

 

D) D) The Indo-US nuclear argument

Pran Chopra ;Asian Age, Mar 11, 2008

 

E)  Can sign N-deal with minority Govt: US

Pioneer, Mar 14, 2008  PTI - New Delhi 

 

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A) US clauses restrict India from using warship

Vishal Thapar / CNN-IBN
ibnlive.com, Mar 15, 2008

New Delhi: It seems India has signed away the right to use its second-biggest warship in the event of war.

The Comptroller and Auditor General has slammed the UPA Government for accepting what it terms as "restrictive clauses" in the purchase of the American warship, USS Trenton — now renamed INS Jalashwa.

These clauses forbid the use of the warship for offensive purposes and even allow intrusive on-board inspections by the US.

The Left feels vindicated by the report, and says, "I told you so".

RSP MP, Abani Roy says, "I don't know why the Government purchased this warship. I don't understand who they are trying to satisfy or who is asking them to purchase such things.

The Left call for a Government explanation to Parliament is backed by bitter rivals — the BJP.
BJP MP Ravi Shankar Prasad says, "This raises very serious questions. How can such a major defence deal be shrouded by such mysterious circumstances?

 

The transfer of the INS Jalashwa to India was not only meant to be a door-opener for big-time military cooperation with the US, but also to give Indian military expeditionary muscle.

The INS Jalashwa can hold as many as 58 armoured vehicles, four tanks and heavy artillery. At the rear end of the ship is a hinged gate which can be lowered into the sea.

There is a well which is filled with water with the help of ballast tanks near the rear gate so that amphibious assault vehicles can then float out into the sea through the hinged gate. These amphibious assault vehicles can carry as many as 2,000 troops to launch an attack on enemy shores.

However, it's clear that any hint of strings attached to military cooperation with the US will find little political support in India.

http://www.ibnlive.com/news/us-clauses-restrict-india-from-using-warship/61288-3.html?xml

 

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B) The truth Talbott hides
 Brahma Chellaney
Asian Age, Mar 15, 2008

The Prime Minister has done well to assure Parliament that he will continue to "seek the broadest possible consensus within the country" over the nuclear deal with the United States. A critical matter like this, which is going to affect the future of India's nuclear programme and tie the country to perpetual, legally irrevocable international inspections, demands such a consensus. The partisan rancour over what has become an increasingly divisive issue needs to be defused. While giving that assurance, the Prime Minister referred to a recent claim by former US deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott that, had the Clinton team offered only "half" of what the Bush administration has proposed now, the Vajpayee government "would have gone for it." The truth is that Talbott says just the opposite in his detailed exposition in Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb, a book he published in 2004.

Talbott has a long record of mounting non-proliferation pressure on India. Before becoming deputy secretary, Talbott travelled to Moscow, as ambassador-at-large, to persuade the Russians to renege on their $75-million contract to sell cryogenic-engine technology to India — dangling carrots and warning that "a viable Indian missile capability could one day pose a security threat to Russia itself." It didn't matter that cryogenic technology has civilian space applications and no nation has employed it in ballistic missiles.

To Talbott, India had to be penalised for retaining its nuclear-weapons option. Yet when India gatecrashed the nuclear club in May 1998, Talbott took the lead — after the shock over the tests had dissipated — to help shift the US policy goal. In place of the lost aim to stop New Delhi from crossing the threshold, a new objective was devised: Prevent India's emergence as a full-fledged nuclear-weapons state by bringing it into the US-led non-proliferation regime.

With that purpose in mind, Talbott, as the Clinton administration's troubleshooter, held extended, closed-door negotiations with then external affairs minister Jaswant Singh during 1998-2000. The discussions that stretched to 14 rounds at ten locations in seven countries have been described by the recently-retired US undersecretary, R. Nicholas Burns, in an article published in the November-December 2007 issue of Foreign Affairs, as "Washington's first truly sustained strategic engagement with the Indian leadership."

That "sustained strategic engagement" was essentially about getting India to accept a set of rigorous non-proliferation benchmarks, by Talbott's own admission. But where the Clinton administration failed, the Bush team is on the scent of success. The impulse to stitch up the deal before it unravels under wiser Indian reflection has triggered a crescendo of calls by US officials: "The clock is ticking;" "the timelines are short;" "we are kind of playing in overtime;" "there's still a lot of work but not a lot of time;" "India must move ahead;" and it's "now or never."

Let's compare the benchmarks the Clinton team tried to impose with the non-proliferation conditions the Bush administration has attached to the deal.

Talbott says in his book, "If there is a deal to be done with India, my guess is that it will be a version of the one offered by the Clinton administration and rejected by the BJP-led government. The four US-proposed non-proliferation benchmarks put forward in 1998 — joining the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, making progress on a fissile material treaty, exercising strategic restraint (by that or some other name), and meeting the highest standard of export controls … should remain the basis of the American policy into the future. That means the US government should persist until the four areas of restraint become the basis of the Indian policy."

Here is Talbott admitting the Vajpayee government rejected the deal that was on offer then and saying the four Clinton-set benchmarks should remain the basis of US policy "into the future" — until India has caved in. In the book, Talbott presents himself as an unapologetic champion of hawkish positions — from mocking New Delhi for wanting to be grandfathered out of the NPT restrictions, to insisting the US cannot give India "a free pass into the nuclear club."

He lampoons Indian leaders he met. "Vajpayee's pauses seemed to last forever … I had never met a politician so laconic." Prime Minister Inder Gujral's 1997 meeting with President Clinton was a washout "in part because Gujral spoke so softly that everyone on the US side had trouble hearing what he was saying." Defence minister George Fernandes "regaled US with the story" of how he had been strip-searched in the US. "He seemed to enjoy our stupefaction at this tale." Sonia Gandhi went from being "diffident and evasive" to being "steely."

If Talbott has kind words for anyone, it is Jaswant Singh, whom he describes as the "persistent and beleaguered champion of moderation." He indeed flatters and pumps up Jaswant Singh, "the Indian statesman," saying it was "Jaswant" (as he calls him) who promised India's signature on the CTBT. Talbott candidly admits the US game-plan was "to get the Indians to accept the CTBT along with meaningful restraints on their nuclear and missile programmes in exchange for our easing sanctions and throttling back on the campaign of international criticism we were orchestrating."

Domestic opposition in India, however, put paid to Jaswant Singh's CTBT pledge. Not only that, the American side ended up empty-handed on the other restraint measures despite the protracted, 14-round talks. Talbott, whose approach in the negotiations was to smooth-talk the other side into submission, rues that Jaswant Singh "lost out" to the "conservatives within the BJP."

Now let's see where the four Clinton-prescribed benchmarks stand today. What sticks out is that the Clinton benchmarks have not only been embraced wholeheartedly by the Bush administration, but also deftly incorporated in the deal, with each benchmark finding unequivocal mention in one or more of the key documents — the July 18, 2005 joint statement, India's Separation Plan, the Hyde Act and the so-called 123 Agreement.

**  Benchmark 1 — a permanent test ban. That benchmark is central to the Bush deal with India. The expansive Hyde Act drags India through the backdoor into the CTBT. The Act admits it goes "beyond Section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act" in mandating that the waiver for India will necessarily terminate with any Indian test. The test ban is also built into the 123 Agreement by granting the US the dual right to seek the return of exported goods and to suspend all cooperation forthwith. In fact, with the Hyde Act going beyond the CTBT to define in technical terms what constitutes a nuclear-explosive test, India is to be held to CTBT-plus obligations.

What Jaswant Singh could not deliver has been ceded by a government whose real centre of power, Sonia Gandhi, paradoxically, was instrumental in scuttling the Vajpayee-led effort to build a political consensus for CTBT signature. Vajpayee's hopes collapsed the moment Sonia Gandhi spoke up at the consensus-building meeting he had called. She said, "Why hurry when the US Senate itself has rejected this treaty? Heavens will not fall if we wait."

 

** Benchmark 2 — restraint on fissile-material production. The Bush deal imposes this check in eclectic ways — from getting India to shut down one of its two research reactors producing weapons-grade plutonium to securing New Delhi's commitment to work "with the US for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty." The Hyde Act proviso for regular presidential reports on India's "rate of production" of fissile material or on any changes in "unsafeguarded nuclear-fuel cycle activities" opens New Delhi to sustained pressure.

Much of India's cumulative historic production of weapons-grade plutonium has come from the Cirus research reactor, to be dismantled by 2010 after having been refurbished at a cost of millions of dollars barely four years ago. Eight indigenous power reactors will also become unavailable for strategic-material needs.

** Benchmark 3 — strategic restraint. The Bush deal seeks to hold India's feet to the non-proliferation fire through the instrumentality of the Hyde Act and 123 Agreement. The controls built into the deal, as Senator Joseph Biden has admitted, will help "limit the size and sophistication of India's nuclear-weapons programme."

While permitting conditional and partial civil nuclear cooperation, the Hyde Act, seeking to hobble the growth of Indian delivery capability, mandates the continued applicability of US missile sanctions law against India. The deal primarily is aimed at ensuring that India's nuclear-deterrent capability remains rudimentary and regionally confined, thus helping promote security dependency on the US, including for missile defence and conventional weapons. Fostering security dependency is the key to winning and maintaining an ally.

** Benchmark 4 — "meeting the highest standard of export controls." India has agreed under the deal to enact "comprehensive export-control legislation" and to unilaterally adhere to the rules of US-led cartels. While the original deal cited two such cartels, the Nuclear Suppliers' Group and Missile Technology Control Regime — both of which continue to exclude India from their membership — the Hyde Act has expanded the list to include more, including the controversial Proliferation Security Initiative.

So, as is clear, all the four Clinton benchmarks are at the heart of the Bush deal with India.
In fact, the Bush deal has far more to show. While the Clinton team could not persuade the sphinx-like Vajpayee to place under international inspection more than the two indigenous power reactors he was willing to offer under a potential deal, the Bush administration has won the Manmohan Singh government's agreement to subject 35 nuclear facilities, including eight existing indigenous power reactors, to permanent external inspection. New Delhi will also shut down Cirus and remove the fuel core from Apsara, Asia's first reactor.

The Bush team could extract such commitments from India by taking the tack Talbott suggested in his book that he wrote with "the cooperation of the department of state," which later — in his words again — "subjected the manuscript to a review to ensure that the contents would not compromise national security."

With the benefit of hindsight, Talbott had advised that the White House use the dual bait of UN Security Council permanent membership and a strategic partnership to "coax India into the non-proliferation mainstream." That is exactly what President Bush did.

Before offering the deal, Washington led India up the garden path on UNSC membership and massaged its ego with statements that it was both "ready to help India become an important power in the 21st century" and open to "a decisively broader strategic relationship." Since the deal was unveiled, a growing number of publicists have been pressed into service to market it as "India's passport to the world."

As a result, what hush-hush negotiations with Jaswant Singh could not achieve, aggressive public diplomacy may pull off, with Burns singing the ditty that the deal is "wildly popular among millions of Indians who see it as a mark of US respect for India." That explains why an inveterate non-proliferation ayatollah like Talbott today is hawking the Bush deal, betting that India's short public memory will help obscure the inconvenient truths.

http://www.asianage.com/presentation/leftnavigation/opinion/op-ed/the-truth-talbott-hides.aspx

 

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C) Nuclear dilemma: The road ahead

A N Prasad ; March 14, 2008
rediff.com
With the safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency reported to have been concluded at the end of five rounds of formal negotiations, a political showdown seems to be in the offing over the Indo-US nuclear deal.

While all those following the progress of the deal are waiting for the outcome of the safeguards negotiations, it may be appropriate to recapitulate the issues involved for fulfilling oft repeated legitimate aspirations.
While the bilateral agreement with the US will broadly spell out the parameters with in which the deal operates, stipulating the rights and obligations on both sides, the safeguards arrangement with the IAEA will showcase the actual implementation of the agreement.
It is like a passport which all Nuclear Suppliers Group members will also look to for satisfying themselves prior to any waiver in the guidelines for nuclear trade with India. It is through the IAEA safeguards agreement that international inspectors gain access to a majority of our nuclear installations which were hitherto forbidden. Hence India needs to carefully incorporate appropriate firewalls to protect strategic interests.

Model safeguards agreements in vogue in the IAEA at present broadly fall into three categories: 
i)  Nuclear Weapon States party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
ii) Non-NWS party to the NPT,
iii) NNWS not party to the NPT.
As an extension to these there is a fourth category covering states who have signed an Additional Protocol to their safeguards agreements with the IAEA. While there is a Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC 540) generally applicable to NNWS, each of the five NWS (P5) have adopted Additional Protocols specifically suited to their interests not necessarily complying with the Model AP.
India comes under category (iii) with no Additional Protocol and it is to be seen whether it will be permitted to evolve an India-specific AP somewhat similar to the NWS. This is important as a model AP has provisions for extremely intrusive inspections with no notice or short notice at any time and at locations originally unspecified based on doubts regarding undeclared nuclear activities or unexplained anomalies in nuclear material accounting, physical verification and so on.
India has consistently refused so far to succumb to repeated attempts by the IAEA to sign the AP. The present deal is going to be a different ball game with India agreeing to open up a major portion of our activities to external scrutiny. There is no model available with the IAEA to cover the new category of a NNWS (the tag which India is inevitably accepting) with a nuclear weapons program. This is an issue that should have been have been dealt with during the negotiations and satisfactorily resolved.
Before moving further it is very essential to see how the main concerns are addressed and how they are legally worded. The following are some of the points relevant in this context.
1. The safeguards agreement with the IAEA is triggered basically by the Indo-US bilateral deal which also later becomes also multilateral with the involvement of the NSG. Though it is not clear what will be the status of the interaction with the NSG in case the US bilateral deal runs into problem for any of the reasons, it is important to know what corrective measures India has insisted on and allowed to incorporate in the safeguards agreement in such an eventuality. Is the safeguards commitment in perpetuity tied up with assurances of fuel supply and currency of the bilateral agreement? Also how is the issue of building up strategic reserve of uranium and right of return of nuclear material and equipment dealt with? These are ticklish issues requiring very careful and detailed scrutiny.
2. The final text of the safeguards agreement as and when revealed, will it be a sanitised version or full text? Is the question of Additional Protocol dealt with now or deferred to a later date? Since this is going to be a highly contentious issue it is in our interest to finalise it now along with the main safeguards agreement to avoid roadblocks as we go along. It will be a serious lapse if the discussion on Additional Protocol is deferred possibly due to time constraints.
3. The Separation Plan which was agreed to with lot of fanfare during President George W Bush's [Images] visit to India in March 2006 has not found specific mention in the 123 text for some reason. It has statements to the effect that India decides which of the nuclear facilities will be included in the civil list and the sequence. It also spells out exclusions of certain facilities and locations as strategic within the prerogative of India. This should be clearly recognised and incorporated in the safeguards text.  
4. The question of safeguards on reprocessing is a complex issue requiring tactful handling since past experience in bilateral with the US on Tarapur was pretty rough. There should not be a repeat of this.
5. Since we have in the 123 text agreed for the implementation of the deal as per national laws without recourse to any international arbitration, we have to be prepared for possible changes in the US laws in future which could have adverse impact on the implementation of the deal itself and the safeguards arrangement. We did face such a situation in Tarapur where a bilateral entered into in 1963 as per the 1954 US Nuclear Act was superceded by the 1778 Nuclear Non Proliferation Act and we were denied supply of fuel agreed to earlier. In the present case, if properly interpreted, as per the 123 agreement not only the Hyde Act but also any amendments or new Acts will be applicable to this deal. This is not wishful thinking but based on actual experience. India has hardly any leverage in forcing any interpretation if it does not match that of the US law.

Though the deal has been discussed in detail at various stages of its progress, before taking a final decision, it is advisable for the law-makers to ponder over various issues of concern dispassionately and seriously once again as the stakes are high involving commitments in perpetuity and once entered into is irreversible.
What is being attempted is creating new history and the outcome should stand the test of time for the long term interests of national security and energy independence. It is dangerous to go with the mindset that our great country cannot survive without this deal! It is an insult to the intellectual strength of our scientists and technologists who have been responsible for making the country proud in this field.
One thing should be borne in mind. If India had not gone ahead with the nuclear tests, US would not be talking to us so seriously and proactively with us about this deal. Let us not underestimate ourselves but act with honor and dignity to play a global role.
A N Prasad is former director of Bhabha Atomic Research Centre and former member, Atomic Energy Commission
http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/mar/14guest3.htm
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D) The Indo-US nuclear argument
Pran Chopra
Asian Age, Mar 11, 2008
Going by the frequency of the recent exchanges between the two countries, it would appear that an Indo-US nuclear wedding has been all but fixed, and only the date needs to be announced. At least that is the opinion being canvassed in the corridors of officialdom. But the latest published documents indicate that it is not yet clear whether there is to be a marriage, and whose rites and customs it will follow if it takes place at all.

Speaking in her customary firm and clipped language, the US secretary of state, Ms Condoleezza Rice said the other day, "We will support nothing ... that is in contradiction to the Hyde Act. It will have to be completely consistent with the obligations of the Hyde Act…"

But India's view of this matter is quite different, and it has been stated with matching precision and clarity by the external affairs minister, Mr Pranab Mukherjee. He assured Parliament on March 3 that "India's rights and obligations on civilian nuclear cooperation with the US arise only from the 123 Agreement that we have agreed upon," whereas the Hyde Act is a piece of America's domestic legislation, "a provision between the executive and the legislative organs of the US government." Presumably for this reason, he added the further clarification that the Act could not override the 123 Agreement.

It is a sad comment on the sorry state to which Parliament has been reduced that this major statement had to come before it when, according to newspapers, "both Houses were in recess." But the issue will have to be taken up again soon because the Left Front, which constitutes "the opposition" in this context, has asked for a meeting on this subject by March 15. The government appears to have no difficulty with this timetable though, again according to newspapers, it may want a few more days before Parliament is called upon to debate the issue again.

What is important to ensure, however, is that the debate should take place before Parliament goes into recess. The date presently fixed for that is March 20. Either that date will need to be deferred by a few days, or the parliamentary agenda at present fixed for the intervening days will need to be adjusted, whether for Indian or American reasons.

But more important than these is the added consideration that this issue is closely related to several others which have come up in Parliament in recent weeks which Parliament has not had the time to debate. The government should have the benefit of Parliament's views on them before it takes them up with America. Therefore, within a matter of days all political policy forums in both countries, and probably in some other countries too, will have to get busy with them.

But in doing so, all forums, and of course the public mind in general, face the handicap that there is a continuing absence of authoritative and reliable information on many issues which matter, and this gap is getting filled only by misleading slogans.

For example, by the question whether India should reject the Hyde Act at the risk of losing more access to nuclear energy. This is one of those rhetorical questions which have their answers built into them. But more useful answers may depend upon well founded answers to a series of preliminary questions which have not even begun to be asked as yet. Answers to questions like what prevails if there is a conflict between India's "rights and obligations under the 123 Agreement," which is a bilateral document, and any "obligations" the US Congress may impose upon US government under the Hyde Act or any other domestic "enabling provision."

Or what happens if there is a conflict between the Hyde Act and India's right to have nuclear trade with any other member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, or between the Hyde Act and any bilateral or multi-lateral trade India might have with a country like Iran, or what, if any, is the difference between the various texts of the 123 Agreement. (Till about September last year India had signed two texts at least according to Mr Pranab Mukherjee.)

More comprehensive is the problem that the country knows little, if anything, about the fairly prolonged conversations that India and the US have had during the past couple of years at various levels, including the heads of the two governments, going back to the first heads of government meetings in the summer of 2005 which began the process of defining the "rights and obligations" of various parties to the 123 Agreement.

Since then there have been many confidential meetings at which, it is safe to assume, "understandings" have been reached which might not become known till long after they go into operation and begin to shape many policies and specific actions.

There is nothing that is very unusual about any of this. In fact it is not only an unavoidable but also an essential part of the policymaking procedures which many countries follow. Policies do go into action well before they can be announced in public. But there is something about the present juncture which makes it more desirable — even if also more difficult — to ensure that the time gaps between the formulation of a policy, its "operationalisation," and its open announcement are kept to the minimum, by the United States as well as by India.

Both countries are headed by governments which might be on their way out even as they take far reaching decisions on long term issues. In the United States the party which took some of them has already lost control of the legislature. In India the government which is already implementing some crucial matters concerning foreign policy is dependent for its survival upon the very political parties which are strongly opposed to the policy directions indicated by it. In both countries, the moral authority of the governments which are taking and implementing the decisions is being undermined day by day by political changes in their federal polities.

Therefore the times require that we, and that includes the United States, afford ourselves a few weeks time before we proclaim policies on behalf of "we the people," or at least before we take irreversible decisions on foreign policy issues which are not of very urgent relevance.

http://www.asianage.com/presentation/leftnavigation/opinion/opinion/the-indo-us-nuclear-argument.aspx

 

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E) Can sign N-deal with minority Govt: US

PTI | New Delhi ;

Pioneer, Mar 14, 2008

The US has made it clear that it was not averse to wrapping up the India-US civil nuclear deal with a minority Government in India, seeking to set at rest questions over the fate of the agreement if Left parties were to withdraw support to ruling UPA.

"Our basic government position is that we can sign an agreement with a duly-constituted Government, whatever its political status," US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher said in an interview to Outlook magazine.

He was responding when referred to External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee's comment that a minority Government "cannot, need not and should not sign a major agreement" like the nuclear deal.

"As long as it is duly-constituted Government of the country, we can sign a deal with it," Boucher said.

India and the US have concluded negotiations on the 123 agreement for cooperation in civil nuclear field but are yet to sign it formally.

There have been questions as to whether the agreement can be signed if the Left parties, which are opposed to the deal, withdraw support to the minority Manmohan Singh Government.

Asked whether Indian officials discussed the possibility of signing a deal with a minority or a caretaker Government, Boucher said, "I don't remember it actually coming up at all during my meetings with Indian officials." Quizzed further on Mukherjee's remarks, the US official said, "that's a political judgement that the Foreign Minister in his political role is going to make. That's not a matter of precedent."

http://www.dailypioneer.com/indexn12.asp?main_variable=FLASH&file_name=cap1%2Etxt&counter_img=1

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