brahma chellaney: make-believe peace

feb 25th, 2007

brahma tells it like it is about the 'piss process'

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Harsh

Make-Believe Peace
Part I
Asian Age, February 24, 2007

Brahma Chellaney

Death and destruction are an abomination to human
conscience. So when terrorist attacks and slayings
become increasingly recurrent, catchphrases like
"peace process," "confidence-building measures" and
"people-to-people contact" help serve as a salve to a
society's conscience. That in essence is the story of
today's India and its benighted relationship with
Pakistan. Unable to contain escalating attacks that
have given it the dubious distinction of being the
world's most-battered victim of terrorism, India has
sought solace behind such beguiling catchwords. In the
process, however, it is unwittingly making itself a
prisoner of make-believe.

The past week began in India with the gruesome
killing of at least 68 innocent people on board the
Samjhauta Express and ended with renewed
confidence-building bonhomie with Pakistan. To those
steeped in Indian epics, the ending may signify the
triumph of good over evil. In reality, however, the
events represent just a new page in an unending epic
about India's love for pretence.

To be sure, democratic India is no different than
autocratic Pakistan in attaching little value to the
lives of ordinary citizens. As long as the governing
elites remain ensconced in a security cover, the
leadership in New Delhi or Islamabad takes any loss of
lives in its stride. The poor, after all, have always
counted for little in both countries.

Nor are the two governments different when it comes to
play-acting and rhetoric. The Indian public, for
instance, has got so accustomed to hearing after each
attack the same empty vows to defeat terrorism that
deep cynicism has set in. The latest train attack is
proof that the two governments have become a mirror
image of each other in terms of reaction.

Every right-thinking citizen wants peace so that
national energies can be concentrated on rapid
economic modernization and the narrowing of
disparities in society. But why should New Delhi
pretend it is engaged in a "peace process" with
Islamabad when in reality the current process is
merely aimed at normalizing relations?

In any case, instead of delivering peace, the process
continues to deliver more terrorism, not just on
India's doorsteps in Jammu and Kashmir as before, but
deep inside the country. In the past year-and-a-half
alone, India has suffered major terrorist bombings
from the Gangetic plains to the south, even as the
Pakistani intelligence has opened new flanks against
this country via Bangladesh and Nepal.

If it were just called a normalization process, that
would not only be more honest but also help instil
greater reality. Pakistan's continued refusal to have
normal trade with India, for instance, is a reminder
that bilateral ties are far from full normalization. A
mutual stake in a peaceful diplomatic environment can
be fashioned only on the building blocks of regional
cooperation and integration. Today the vaunted South
Asian Free-Trade Area (SAFTA) accord is in danger of
being stillborn.

Another official pretence heard in recent days is that
the Samjhauta Express attack was an attempt to
"derail" the supposed peace process. This suggests the
bombers were naïve to believe that their act would
disrupt a process that has yet to take bilateral ties
to where they were in 1999 before the Kargil war,
despite the much-trumpeted opening of new cross-border
transportation routes. When the process survived the
much deadlier bomb attacks on Mumbai commuter trains
last July, how could a strike on the Samjhauta Express
wreck the ongoing dialogue?

In any event, the dialogue process has a
not-so-invisible third party prodding and guiding from
the back — a party that refuses to talk to Iran (on
grounds it doesn't talk to "evil") but demands India
kiss and make up with a military dictatorship that
already has a lot of blood on its hands. It is because
of this third-party role that, despite the
qualitatively escalating and geographically expanding
terrorism it confronts, India has huffed and puffed
but stayed in the farcical peace process. The
terrorists and their patrons not only cherish this
factor but also have enough experience to know that as
long as they continue to kill ordinary citizens but
spare political leaders (who with their commando rings
are difficult to target in any case), New Delhi will
continue to negotiate with Pakistan.

With the aid of a domestic media that tends to easily
go over the top, Indian officials have also suggested
that the militants' detestation of the Samjhauta
Express made the train the target. But that begs a
question: Could the bombers really have thought that
one attack would eliminate from service a train that
has run regularly since 1976, except for a two-year
hiatus? Also, why was the train attacked in India, not
in Pakistan?

India may be loath to face up to reality, but the
harsh truth is that there is a clear design behind the
increasing frequency of major terror strikes against
it. First, by attacking a range of targets, from
India's business capital and Silicon Valley to major
pilgrimage centres, the terrorists have driven home
the message that they can strike at will anywhere.

Second, by saddling India with the highest incidence
of terrorism in the world, the perpetrators and their
masterminds help present it internationally as a
country riven by internal strife. They cannot slow
down India's GDP growth rate, but they have sought to
put the accent on the negative to help undercut its
rising profile.

The mounting tide of terrorist attacks exposes India's
internal frailty in roughly the same way that
Pakistan's emergence as a common thread in the
investigations of most acts of international terror
raises troubling questions about that country's
stability. This gives vicarious comfort to those
generals in Islamabad who have always believed that
India cannot be allowed to rise without Pakistan's own
ascension, and that a sinking Pakistan should take
India down with it.

Three, the generals still value home-grown terrorist
militias as useful proxies to bleed India and to press
it to make concessions on Kashmir. To suggest that
only some elements in the Pakistan military
establishment are tied to the terrorists is to say
that there are rogue elements in the military and
intelligence beyond the control of the government. If
that were true, it would be a strange paradox that the
writ of a military dictatorship doesn't extend fully
to its own base — the military — as well as a cause
for international concern that rogue officers are on
the terrorist prowl.

If any motive can logically be deduced for the
cowardly attack on the hapless Samjhauta Express
passengers, it is a frightful one. It is as if some
sinister force, playing with the blood of the
innocent, was perhaps seeking to prove, under the nose
of the Indian government, that Pakistan is indeed a
terror victim.

It took military ruler Pervez Musharraf no time to
portray Pakistan as a victim and to claim the attack
would "strengthen the resolve" for "peace between the
two countries." His regime was also quick to resurrect
its demand from last year for joint anti-terror
investigations, but India did well to shoot it down.
Remember the outrage in India when Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh, like a bolt from the blue, turned
Indian policy on its head and declared Pakistan a
fellow victim of terror on the fifth anniversary of
9/11? He went on to embrace Pakistan as a partner
against terror. The PM's case was that since India had
tried in vain to contain growing terrorism, it could
now employ a joint mechanism to persuade the terrorist
sponsor to correct its course. Even if the joint
mechanism didn't deliver results, the reasoning went,
India will not be a loser. Such was Dr. Singh's
prescience in calling Pakistan a fellow victim of
terror that just over five months later a number of
Pakistanis fell victim to an act of terror on Indian
soil.
Perhaps it is just a coincidence that the train
bombing occurred on the eve of the Pakistan foreign
minister's visit and about two weeks before the first
meeting of the joint anti-terror mechanism. That this
first meeting is to take place nearly six months after
the mechanism was announced is a reflection of the
haste with which India embraced a half-baked proposal
from a third party now promoting peace by zealously
selling weapons to both sides. But if Indian
investigators do find credible evidence to link the
train bombers with one of the terrorist militias
fathered by the Pakistani generals, like the
Lashkar-e-Taiba or Jaish-e-Muhammed, it will raise the
troubling issue if the perpetrators acted at the
behest of their military bosses.

Is it inconceivable that a military regime waging a
low-intensity conflict against India centred on the
export of jihad to murder and maim the innocent would
order, in pursuit of dubious political goals, a
terrorist strike that kills a number of its own
countrymen, mostly Mohajirs and Hindus? And with
Pakistani missiles named after invaders like Ghauri,
Ghaznavi, Babar and Abdali, was it a mere accident
that the train attack occurred in Panipat, the scene
of three ignominious defeats in Indian history, the
last being at the hands of Abdali in 1761?

(To be continued)


Time for Reality Check
Part II
Asian Age, February 25, 2007

Brahma Chellaney

Pakistani military ruler Pervez Musharraf maintains
not only his two-faced approach on terrorism but also
the self-serving myth that his rule helps prevent an
Islamist takeover. Even if he were to die suddenly,
military rule would continue in Pakistan, with another
general succeeding him. In fact, far from being a
bulwark against radicals, Musharraf has helped
marginalize and splinter mainstream parties and
allowed Islamists to gain political space.

With Musharraf benefiting more than any other ruler in
the world from the 9/11 events, Pakistan has emerged
the third largest recipient of US aid, which includes
economic and military assistance and counter-terrorism
subsidies. In addition, America has helped Pakistan
reschedule repayment of international debt totalling
$13.5 billion, and is currently providing $5 billion
in credit guarantees for Pakistani purchase of 62 F-16
fighter-jets.

Still, as the US national intelligence director
admitted last month, Pakistan is the hub of a global
web of Al Qaeda connections and "home for some top
terrorist leaders," with President George W. Bush
himself calling Pakistan "wilder than the Wild West."
Musharraf's regime has yet to realize that before
Pakistan's image can be transformed, it has to cut off
its institutional support to terrorism. Indeed, until
the military's vice-like grip on power is broken,
Pakistan is likely to remain a problem state, neither
at peace with itself nor with its neighbours.

The make-believe on India's part, however, continues.
New Delhi has not only embraced as its partner a
regime wedded to terror, but also chosen not to speak
about the lack of democracy in Pakistan and about
Musharraf's recently unveiled plan to stay enthroned
for five more years beyond 2007. While New Delhi has
called Pakistan a "victim" of terrorism, Musharraf's
chief benefactor, Bush, has painted a grim picture of
Al Qaeda's strength inside that country, saying,
"Taliban and Al Qaeda figures do hide in remote
regions of Pakistan … and recruit and launch attacks."

India's latest showpiece is an agreement with the
Musharraf regime to purportedly reduce the "risk from
accidents relating to nuclear weapons." India needs to
deepen its engagement with Pakistan at all levels. But
confidence building cannot rest on the back of a
public-relations gimmick like this accord.

How can any kind of risks be reduced when the
Pakistani nukes are with the military and the Indian
nukes under tight civilian oversight? While the
Pakistan military has integrated nuclear weapons with
its war-fighting doctrine and strategy, India is
committed to a retaliation-only posture. Despite
global concerns about terrorists acquiring weapons of
mass destruction, the current international spotlight
on Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran helps obscure the danger
that Pakistan — with terrorists and nuclear weapons
controlled by Islamist generals — could be just one
step away from our worst nightmare.

If the Pakistan military didn't know about the nuclear
black-market ring run by Pakistani scientists and
intelligence and army officials for 16 long years, how
can it offer to reduce any "risks," that too from
"accidents" (whatever that means)? All that the latest
agreement says is that in the event of an "accident,"
the concerned state will do what it is supposed to do
in any case — "immediately take necessary measures to
minimize the radiological consequences" — and, if need
be, share "urgent information" with the other side. If
any "accident" can be covered up, one can be sure the
Pakistan military will do just that.

In the case of the far-reaching proliferation ring, a
single individual, A.Q. Khan, was conveniently made
the scapegoat in a charade that saw Musharraf pardon
and shield him. The world has been made to believe
that Khan set up and ran a nuclear Wal-Mart largely on
his own. India itself has contributed to the creation
of this fable through its references to "the A.Q . Khan
ring."

Of greater consequence for India is the nuclearization
of Pakistani terrorism. Musharraf and his fellow
generals would continue to export terror as long as
they can play nuclear poker. Disabling Pakistan's
potential for nuclear blackmail thus holds the key to
forcing it to act against transnational terrorists on
its soil. Yet, ever since the scandal over the
Pakistani illicit nuclear exports broke, India has
chosen not to depict the Pakistan military as a rogue
proliferator but rather to give it succour through
ostensible nuclear confidence-building talks started
by the Vajpayee government.

India is still unduly influenced by the Bush
administration's misbegotten policy on Pakistan.
America could be a positive influence on Indo-Pakistan
relations but the Bush team's geopolitical games make
it otherwise. Washington uses Pakistan for multiple
objectives: as a gateway to military operations in
Afghanistan; for reconnaissance and covert action in
Iran; and to counterbalance India. Bush's looming
confrontation with Iran has only enhanced Pakistan's
importance as a staging ground for US anti-Iranian
operations.

If in the process a dictatorial but pliant regime is
strengthened in Islamabad, why would the White House
care? Bush certainly has one concern — continued
Pakistani assistance to an increasingly resurgent
Taliban — yet such is his policy tangle, he doesn't
know how to stop that. But what has New Delhi to gain
by deferring to the US on Pakistan?

As if turning the entire region between India and
Israel into an arc of volatility is not enough, the
Bush team seems itching to militarily take on Iran —
an action that would disrupt energy shipments to India
through the Strait of Hormuz and potentially have a
cascading effect on the Indian economy, which is more
dependent on the Gulf for oil and gas imports than any
other major economy in the world. Yet, even on Iran,
New Delhi chose to defer to the US.

Remember what the prime minister assured Parliament
when his government marginalized India's role on Iran
by voting to take the Iranian nuclear issue out of the
International Atomic Energy Agency board (of which
India is a permanent member) to the UN Security
Council (where India has no role to play)? He said
India was opposed to punitive sanctions or coercive
measures against Iran. Now, India has been in the
international vanguard in implementing Security
Council Resolution 1737 on new sanctions against Iran.

The Bush administration transfers a range of
offensive, India-directed weapon systems to Pakistan
and then lobbies feverishly to sell arms to New Delhi
while pretending to be a factor for peace in the
region. If there is one confidence-building measure
crying for adoption, it is a commitment by India and
Pakistan to suspend arms imports for a specified
number of years — a moratorium that will have little
effect on their security but help save tens of
billions of dollars for pressing national needs. This
is a moratorium, you can be sure, Washington will not
encourage.

In fact, until the US stops geopolitically exploiting
Pakistan, Pakistanis will not regain their democratic
rights. And innocent Indians and Pakistanis will
continue to get killed by the Pakistan military's
terrorist proxies.

A military autocracy that is part of the problem
cannot become part of the solution. To secure enduring
peace on the subcontinent, there has to be a return to
civilian rule in Pakistan, with the people there
getting the freedoms that Indians enjoy. In the
absence of open elections and public accountability,
Musharraf's rule has created a pressure-cooker
society, giving rise to greater extremism. What
Pakistan needs is a safety valve — true democratic
participation that would empower the masses and allow
issues to be decided at the ballot box.

For India, the latest terrorist killings should be an
occasion for a reality check on its Pakistan policy.
No policy that forsakes reality can deliver
sustainable dividends.

(Concluded)