pk iyengar: 10 myths about nuke deal

jul 22nd, 2008

perhaps the most succinct and simple article i have seen on this issue.

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10 myths about N-deal

*PK Iyengar

The India-US nuclear deal is not in the national interest. It presents the
very serious danger of capping our strategic programme by bringing us into
the non-proliferation regime. That alone is reason enough not to go forward
with the deal*

In spite of the fact that the India-US nuclear deal is not in the national
interest, many in the country, and in Parliament, support it because of
misconceptions about the deal, which need to be clarified.


*Myth 1: The nuclear deal is an agreement between India and the US for the
American Government to supply nuclear fuel and reactors to India. *

Contrary to common perception, the nuclear deal is not a commitment on the
part of the US Government to provide us with uranium or nuclear reactors.
Presently American law prohibits nuclear cooperation with India because we
have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). All the nuclear deal
does is to grant a 'waiver' from that law, so that American companies can
now pursue nuclear trade with India. However, if India conducts a test at
any time, the waiver is revoked.

*Myth 2: Imported uranium and nuclear reactors will be cheap and
cost-effective. *

Even if the nuclear deal is made operational, the actual sale of uranium and
nuclear reactors will be governed by market forces -- there are no
guarantees of cheap or competitive nuclear power. To the contrary, there is
every reason to believe that it will be expensive. The cost of uranium in
the international market has gone up four-fold in the last few years, and
will rise further with further demand. The same is true of the cost of steel
and other materials used in a reactor. Manpower costs are much higher in the
West. The example of the Dabhol power plant has already shown us that
importing power plants from the West is not necessarily a viable option. We
would do well to learn from that experience.

*Myth 3: The nuclear deal will safeguard our energy security. *

It is true that nuclear energy is green energy, and therefore essential for
our long-term energy security. But this does not translate into the nuclear
deal ensuring our energy security. Power from the nuclear reactors that we
buy will definitely be more expensive than indigenous nuclear power.
Further, to keep the reactors running, we will always be dependent on
imported uranium, which is controlled by a cartel -- the Nuclear Suppliers
Group. Therefore, the nuclear deal, by making us dependent on the cartel,
will only compromise our energy security. Only our indigenous nuclear power
programme can truly ensure our energy security. And in any case, for the
next few decades, nuclear power will not exceed six per cent of our total
electricity production.

*Myth 4: Importing nuclear plants is a quick-fix solution to the present
power crisis. *

Nuclear technology is sensitive. Even if the nuclear deal goes through, it
will take time to buy and set up new reactors. We have examples of the
French reactors in China, and the Russian reactors at Kudankulam in India.
It will actually take longer to set up foreign reactors compared to
indigenous ones. Just the negotiations and legal formalities could take
years. It will be at least eight years before we see the first power.

*Myth 5: The nuclear deal does not stop India from further nuclear testing,
and, therefore, does not compromise our national security. *

It is very clearly stated in the 123 Agreement it will be subject to
national laws, and the Hyde Act is a law of the US. Therefore, the 123
Agreement is certainly circumscribed by the Hyde Act, which very clearly
states that if India tests a nuclear device, all further nuclear trade is to
stop, and the nuclear materials that have already been sold to us have to be
returned. No future Indian Government would dare to jeopardise such a huge
investment in nuclear power by testing. So, for all practical purposes the
nuclear deal caps our strategic programme -- which is precisely what the
Americans intend.

*Myth 6: We can pass a national law to counteract the Hyde Act, and this
will protect our strategic programme. *

Just as the Hyde Act is not binding on us, our laws are not binding on the
US. We can certainly amend our Atomic Energy Act to enable participation of
the private sector in nuclear power. But if we pass a law saying that we
will retain the right to test, it will have no influence on the actions of
the US. If and when we test, they can simply quote the 123 Agreement and the
Hyde Act, and pull out all their nuclear materials, leaving us devastated.
The only option here is to renegotiate the 123 Agreement and have the clause
inserted there. However, the Americans are unlikely to agree to this, since
it goes against their non-proliferation policy.

*Myth 7:The nuclear deal and the safeguards agreement give India the status
of a nuclear power. *

While the July 18, 2005 India-US joint statement did indeed talk about India
being treated as an equal by the US, neither the 123 Agreement nor the IAEA
safeguards agreement has borne this out. In fact, the IAEA safeguards
agreement that has been negotiated is closely based on the model agreement
that IAEA has for non-nuclear weapon states. The safeguards agreements that
the nuclear weapon countries have signed with the IAEA require them to put
very few reactors under safeguards, and allow them to take reactors out of
safeguards. India, however, will have to place most of its reactors under
safeguards for perpetuity. Therefore, we are certainly not being treated as
a nuclear weapons country.

*Myth 8: Without the nuclear deal, we cannot get adequate uranium for our
domestic nuclear programme. *

The Department of Atomic Energy has always maintained that we have enough
indigenous uranium for 10,000 MW of nuclear power for 30 years. We are not
yet close to that number. The present mismatch in uranium availability for
operating reactors is a consequence of poor planning, and inadequate
prospecting and mining. There is talk of importing 40,000 MW of nuclear
power, which will cost not less than $ 100 billion or Rs 4 lakh crore. If
even 10 per cent of this money were to be spent on uranium mining in
existing mines in Andhra Pradesh and Meghalaya, on searching for new uranium
deposits, and negotiating with non-NSG countries, there will be enough
uranium for a robust indigenous nuclear power programme, until such time as
thorium reactors take over.

*Myth 9: The safeguards agreement with the IAEA guarantees fuel supplies
even if India conducts a nuclear test. *

The safeguards agreement only notes, in the preamble, that India's
concurrence to the safeguards is linked to getting fuel supplies. However,
the IAEA has no role in this matter, and certainly, no such commitment is
given in the safeguards agreement. It also notes that India may take
'corrective measures' in the event of a disruption of foreign fuel supplies.
It does not specify what these measures will be, it does not provide for any
role for the IAEA in this, and it does not bestow legitimacy on any such
measures that India may take. It may well be that any such measures that we
suggest, such as importing fuel from another country, will be disallowed by
the NSG. The only tangible corrective measure is for India to explore and
mine more uranium, and to enhance enrichment capability to provide fuel for
those reactors. The latter is subject to uncertainty.

*Myth 10: The nuclear deal has no impact on our foreign policy. *

The Hyde Act states clearly that it is the policy of the US to secure
India's cooperation on a number of issues involving Iran, including its
capability to reprocess nuclear fuel (in spite of the fact that Iran, as an
NPT signatory, has the right to enrich uranium for use in light-water
reactors). This has nothing to do with the deal, and can only be related to
influencing our foreign policy.

It can, therefore, be seen, that the India-US nuclear deal is not in the
national interest. It presents the very serious danger of capping our
strategic programme. That alone is reason enough not to go forward with the
deal. Additionally, it does not guarantee the energy security that we are
seeking, and, in fact, may only end up making us as vulnerable to the
nuclear cartel, as we are today to the oil cartel.

It is easy to see why the US wants this deal so badly. At virtually no cost,
since there is no commitment towards fuel supplies, they can cap our
strategic programme, bring us into the NPT net through the back door, as a
non-nuclear power, keep a close eye on our nuclear activities, including
R&D, through intrusive IAEA inspections, and subjugate us to the wishes of
the nuclear cartel.

-- *The writer is former chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.*