China And the Indian Ocean: Zone of Peace or Area of Future Conflicts?
S.Gopal, C3S Paper No.711 dated January 8, 2011
Alfred Thayer Mahan , the U.S Naval strategist of the 19th Century , in his
celebrated book "The influence of sea power upon history 1660-1783 " held
that the most powerful navy will control the globe and that command of the
sea borne commerce was the key to winning wars . National greatness,
according to him , was inextricably associated with the sea, with its
commercial usage in peace time and its control in war. Today a large section
of strategists in many countries including China and India are adherents to
his view . The Mahanian View becomes extremely relevant in examining China's
view and future policies on Indian ocean.
The Chinese enunciation of the Mahanian view was contained in the Defence
white paper issued in 2004 ,when it called for strengthening the
capabilities for winning both command of the sea and command of the air .
Further proof of this outlook among the Chinese navy came with the statement
of Admiral Wu Shengli the commander of the PLAN, who proclaimed that China
is an "oceanic" nation .Hu Jintao , the President added to this by
emphasizing the need for a strong and modern navy for China.
Importance of Indian Ocean for China
With an area of nearly 75 million sq. kms., the Indian Ocean Region
comprising 56 nations and stretching across 7 time zones ,1/3 of world's
population , touching 25 % of the land mass , its sea lanes carrying 70% of
world's oil and petroleum products , Indian ocean is one of the most
important water ways of the world. Apart from its importance as carrier lane
of the ship borne commerce, it is also an important source of mineral
resources, (polymetallic sulfide deposits ) in its hydrothermal vents .
These deposits contain strategic metals such as zinc, copper, cobalt ,
silver . The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) boasts of 40% of world's gold, 90% of
diamond , 60% of Uranium , apart from vast deposits of coal,( particularly
Australia , India and South Africa ) copper and iron ore. The Manganese
nodules form the basis of mineral resources in Central Indian Ocean basin
and was first discovered by an Indian Survey Ship " Gavashani" in 1980.
Unfortunately the region also suffers from a high level of international and
internal conflict and is a key venue for international piracy. It suffers
from some 70% of the world's natural disasters. The region is an important
locus of international terrorism, given its high levels of poverty and
access to drugs and small arms . Piracy as a serious threat can be gauged
from the fact that with 239 cases in 2006 it went up to 406 in 2009.
Countries 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 sep30
India 4 7 10 10 4
Bangladesh 33 13 9 12 18
Srilanka — 4 1 — —
Somalia 8 26 12 47 56
Gulf of Aden 9 10 51 100 56
Malacca St. 8 4 2 2 1
Arabian Sea 1 4 — 1 2
Indian Ocean 1
For China , Indian Ocean is a vital life line of its economy. China imports
more than four fifths of its oil through Indian ocean and the narrow Malacca
Strait. Apart from being a life line for its energy imports , ship-borne
imports of iron ore, coal and bauxite and other raw ingredients for Chinese
economic growth comes through Indian Ocean.
China's Energy Supply Route
The Greatest maritime security fear for China is the choke point at the
Malacca Strait which can hold up its energy supply from the middle east
through Indian ocean. In Nov. 2003 President Hu Jintao termed this the
"Malacca Dilemma . Out of the ninety five percent of the oil for China
transported by sea, 80 percent is shipped through the Malacca strait.
Shipping in the strait is extremely crowded, and infested with pirates and
terrorists.
The Malacca Strait
Chinese fears are not completely unfounded. The U.S. Navy has for decades
been helping to secure vital chokepoints in the Indian Ocean, often
operating from a base on the British atoll of Diego Garcia,. And in October
2007, it implied that it was seeking a sustained forward presence in the
Indian Ocean and the western Pacific but no longer in the Atlantic — a
momentous shift in overall U.S. maritime strategy. The document 'Marine
Corps Vision and Strategy 2025′ also concluded that the Indian Ocean and its
adjacent waters will be a central theater of global conflict and competition
this century.
In the calculation of China's strategic defence planners , the USA will
remain the primary threat followed by Taiwan , Japan and then India . China
fears the domination of the US in the Pacific and latter's ability to cut
off supplies for China at Malacca Straits and India sitting astride the
Indian Ocean and Japan as the US ally at the south china sea. Zhang Ming, a
Chinese naval analyst, has warned that the 244 islands that form India's
Andaman and Nicobar archipelago could be used like a "metal chain" to block
the western entrance to the Strait of Malacca , According to Zhang . "India
is perhaps China's most realistic strategic adversary."
China has also been following alternative energy projects in Central Asia,
such as an agreement to develop oil and gas fields in Kazakhstan and
agreements to construct pipelines in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, among
others, but the projects have proven expensive, logistically difficult, and
complicated by inadequate infrastructure in western China. Central Asia also
is plagued by regional instability which adds to the uncertainty of future
development and long-term reliability
Some global developments in the last decades of the twentieth century has
helped China in its quest for increasing its strategic power in the south
.The collapse of the Soviet Union and withdrawal of Soviet forces from
Mongolia relieved China's pressure on China's northern and western borders.
Additionally in the south ,Vietnam was deprived of support from its Soviet
benefactor which also relieved pressure on China. China also sought to
relieve pressure from India by providing Pakistan with missile and nuclear
weapons technologies.
These strategic advantages coupled with a galloping economy has led to a
more aggressive foreign and strategic policy on the part of China . Unlike
Deng who advised "tao guang yanghui", (lie low, bide your time') ,Hu Jintao
seems to have decided to follow a more aggressive policy with the new found
confidence of an economically galloping China. A more assertive policy is
evident in the stand offs against the US and also with India with its claims
on Arunachal Pradesh and denial of visas for people from that area, denial
of visas to Army officers who served in Kashmir and stapled visas for people
from Kashmir.
China started addressing the security issues quite early . Even in the 1980s
Deng Xiaoping took steps to modernize the fledgling PLA Navy. He envisaged
that the PLA Navy would have to play an important role in future in
safeguarding sea-lanes vital to China's commerce and recovering 'lost
territories'. As far back as 1982, he appointed , with the rank of Admiral ,
Liu Huaqing, then the only senior PLA officer with sea experience, to
modernize the PLA Navy and equip it with a doctrine .
Sensing the vital role submarines play in Naval warfare , China is producing
and acquiring them at a rapid rate. In addition to submarines, the Chinese
are focusing on buying naval mines, ballistic missiles that can hit moving
targets at sea, and technology that blocks signals from GPS satellites, on
which the U.S. Navy depends. They also have plans to acquire at least one
aircraft carrier . The goal of the Chinese is "sea denial," or dissuading
U.S. carrier strike groups from closing in on the Asian mainland wherever
and whenever they wanted.
China is also following the US coined policy of "the string of pearls" under
which it has been constructing new ports, airports, logistical facilities,
and improvement of those that might already exist including supplies and
refuelling and electronic listening stations to serve dual trade and
military interests , in Indian Ocean littoral states.- particularly those
surrounding India . The sea lanes of the 'string of pearls' run through the
strategic choke points , strait of Mandab, Strait of Malacca, Strait of
Hormuz, and strait of Lambok as well as other strategic naval interests such
as Pakistan (Gwadar Port), Srilanka (Hambantota), Bangladesh (Chittagong) .
Myanmar (Kyakpyu port off the Arakan coast in Myanmar ).
China has been developing close strategic and economic relations with the
Govts. of these states , particularly those surrounding India , following a
value neutral policy .Human right violations of these Govts. are brushed
aside as "internal affairs ". Supporting the military Junta in Myanmar and
helping Srilanka with arms to crush the LTTE are classic examples. This
hands off policy also suits these states who respond heavily to the Chinese
overtures , as they see China as a strategic counter weight against imagined
strategic threats from India.
Among all states China's relations with Pakistan, Myanmar and Srilanka merit
some greater mention and are discussed below :
China has always supported Pakistan as a hedge against India. It has offered
help in arms and military aircraft industries, nuclear and missile
capabilities. The most concrete nature of the Sino-Pakistani relations can
be further seen in the opening in 1982 of the Karakoram Highway that
connects Kashgar in China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region with Islamabad
which the then Dy. Prime Minister Li Xiannian described as a high way for
supplying Pakistan with arms . The latest example is the continuing
assistance in building two more nuclear power stations in Chasma brushing
aside the opposition of other members of the Nuclear Supplies Group (NSG)
which opposes it on the ground of Pakistan not having signed up for
comprehensive safe guards with the IAEA and Pakistan's track record as a
proliferator . China counters it by pointing out the special treatment for
India under the Indo- US nuclear accord. It says that this has disturbed the
nuclear equilibrium in South Asia and in any case this is done under
bilateral agreements signed before China joined the NSG.
Similarly it has developed a very close economic , intelligence and military
relationship with Myanmar which it sees as a strategic asset. Apart from Oil
and natural gas , Myanmar has important strategic materials like Zinc,
Copper, Uranium, timber, and hydropower . China assisted Myanmar in
establishing naval bases on Hianggyi Island in the Irrawaddy river Delta and
in the Great Coco Island in the Indian Ocean, approximately 30 nautical
miles from India's Andaman Islands. PLA Navy could reach the Indian Ocean
via Myanmar-controlled islands which are near the Indian-controlled islands
. PLAN would be able to shorten the distance by 3000 km to reach to the Bay
of Bengal, without passing through the Malacca Strait.
The Chinese are constructing (or upgrading) commercial and naval bases and
building roads, waterways, and pipelines in order to link the Bay of Bengal
to the southern Chinese province of Yunnan .Chinese oil corporations have
invested in Myanmar's oil and gas fields since 2004 and Petro China have
built a gas pipeline from the A-1 block in the Shwe field off the coast of
Rahine State to Yunnan Province. In early 2009, China began the construction
of oil and gas pipelines from the Kyaukpyu port on the Bay of Bengal in
proximity to the Yunnan Province – a US $2.5 billion project that was signed
in November 2008. Moreover, Strategic analysts argue that Kyaukphyu port was
also a part of the 'String of Pearls' strategy in geopolitics, involving the
extension of its influence in both the Pacific and Indian oceans, while
reducing China's dependence on the Straits of Malacca. It is obvious that
Kyaukphyu gas pipeline would provide an alternative route for China to get
access to the Indian Ocean via Myanmar and is of strategic importance for
Chinese interests in the 21st century .
The Indian Coast Guards captured , in 1994, three Chinese trawlers in Indian
waters. These vessels, which were flying Myanmerese flags, were reportedly
equipped with sophisticated electronic surveillance equipment, capable of
eavesdropping on official Indian communications. This incident has been
cited as further evidence of the strategic links between China and Myanmar ,
and of China's aggressive designs in the Indian Ocean region.
With Srilanka , China has provided military and political support during
former's long counterinsurgency operations , including significant supplies
of fighter aircraft, naval combatants, and a variety of other military
equipment . True to its value neutral attitude , there were no criticism
from China of the way in which Sri Lanka dealt with the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (Tamil Tigers). Of course, this is in sharp contrast to
attitudes of Western NGOs and governments, which expressed concern that the
Srilankan counterinsurgency methods were excessively brutal. For example,
the United States suspended aid to Colombo in 2007 on human rights grounds.
China's arms sales have been the decisive factor in ending the military
stalemate , which was publicly acknowledged by a Srilankan diplomat Godage
who wrote in an article in "The Island " that they were able to end the LTTE
insurrection because China threw its weight behind them and sent them the
required arms.
Another significant development is the construction of a large container
port at Hambantota, with some $300 million in funding from China's
Export-Import Bank..The first phase of the latter project has since been
completed and inaugurated by President of Srilanka . Hambantota is about 6
NM from main shipping lanes and is a convenient mid-way point on the
sea-routes between China, and the Middle East and Africa.
Oil-bunkering/storage facilities, when completed in Hambantota, would be a
great asset for China , especially when China manages to get its navy to use
the port .
Recently, Sri Lanka allocated an exploration block in the Mannar Basin to
China for petroleum exploration. This allocation brings China close to
India's southern tip, thus raising strategic concerns for India. The Indian
oil companies in this region , would now face competition from Chinese oil
companies
China is also developing closer relations with Maldives . It is apparently
planning to develop a submarine base at Marao, one of the largest islands in
Maldives to counter the Indian Navy's southern command. This would give a
great boost to China in its quest for security in the Indian Ocean ,
particularly against the US advantage with Diego Garcia and will help China
in restricting the growth of the Indian navy in the Indian Ocean.
China has been concentrating on some littoral countries like Mauritius and
Seychelles. Mauritius, with an area of 2,040 sq. .km and a population of 1.3
million is located strategically in the Indian Ocean's southwest quadrant.
Today, Mauritius is a part of China's geo-strategic thrust into the Indian
Ocean. Since 1972 when China established diplomatic relations, Mauritius was
the first African country to open a Chinese cultural centre, and exchanges
in culture and education have gained some momentum . China plans to set up
the Shanxi Tianli Enterprises business park for Chinese firms at around $730
million, making it the largest foreign direct investment in the country. The
project will augur expansion of Chinese operations in the region using
Mauritius as a gateway. Exports worth an estimated $200 million per year,
almost 10 per cent of Mauritius' total exports last year would be created.
In February 2009, President Hu Jintao visited Mauritius . China agreed to
lend $260 million to expand Mauritius's only international airport; as well
as an interest-free loan of 40 million yuan ($5.9 million) and a 30 million
yuan grant .
China has been carefully crafting its future military strategies in this
regard . In the Western Pacific Ocean; It has changed its stance from
competing with the US in terms of maritime power to acknowledging latter's
dominance in the region thus showing a cooperative stance. But it follows a
firm policy on sovereignty issues in maritime issues and to maintain its
control on the first island chain including the Senkaku and the Spratlys. It
believes that deterrence would serve as a better strategy in the South China
Sea and for protecting other maritime concerns instead of offensive
posturing
China has expanded its comprehensive influence on the Southeast Asian region
by way of providing to the countries of Indochina loans for national
development, military ordnance, technology transfers and joint/combined
military exercises. It has also provided support to states facing political
problems in the international community.
China has been shoring up its defence prowess to meet any contingency in the
region of the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean . It has the most active
land-based ballistic and cruise missile program in the world concentrating
on improving the accuracy, penetration and survivability of its nuclear
missiles and focusing on medium-range missile development including
ballistic and cruise missiles. It has focused on submarine capabilities
instead of surface ships
China is busy giving teeth to its navy. It is working on a DF-21 (CSS5) Anti
Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM), missile that has a range in excess of 1,500
km, is armed with a maneuverable warhead . When integrated with appropriate
command and control systems, it is intended to provide the PLA the
capability to attack ships, including aircraft carriers, in the western
Pacific Ocean – a weapon that promises to China's strategic disadvantage
vis-à-vis the US; it can decapitate American warships in the region. The PLA
is busy improving the maneuverability capability of this missile with
location , identification and targetting with OTH radars and other
technologies . This according to Chinese thinking will pose a threat to
American Aircraft carriers which is the main stay of American dominance of
the Asia Pacific Region and would thus serve to deter the U.S. from closing
in on China .
China is consciously investing in developing supersonic anti-ship missiles
that would skim just meters above the water, A long-range cruise missile
costs half a million US dollars, while a typical US aircraft carrier costs
over one billion dollars. In other words, one American aircraft carrier can
buy ten thousand long-range cruise missiles. One or two such missiles can
disable or sink an aircraft carrier. China can use its missile power to
enforce a no-go zone in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea
which it has begun to view as its exclusive offshore preserve.
On 27 August 2010, the Chinese authorities announced that a domestic
submersible called Jiaolong had reached a depth of 3,759 meters. The Chinese
submersible is 8.2 meters long, weighs nearly 22 tons, can carry a crew of
three (one driver and two researchers) and is designed to reach a depth of
7,000 meters. Jiaolong is considered to be the world's only deep-sea vessel
that can theoretically reach that depth. Jiaolong in Chinese folklore is a
mythical shape-shifting water dragon. This would give the Chinese access to
99.8 per cent of the world's ocean floor and the capability of harnessing
the mineral wealth, especially oil. It would also give them the capability
of viewing and examining submarine cables that carry other nations
communications and objects China has also been working for years on Under
water unmanned vehicles (UUV ) for almost three decades.
A steadfast approach for design and construction of UUVs is meant for
military purposes.
This would include following strategic and tactical purposes.
1. Intelligence gathering
2. Mine laying and clearance
3. Laying and monitoring of sensor chains in areas of interest, with UUVs
themselves used as sensor chains
4. Disruption and monitoring of communications carried by submarine cables
5. Striking at strategic and tactical targets by remote launched weapons or
expendable UUVs
6. Communication link especially in mid-ocean areas not under human
surveillance
7. Monitoring of shipping especially at choke points
To conclude , It is obvious that Indian Ocean is a vital water way for China
in view of the energy supply from the mid east. It will continue to take all
measures to protect security of its vital supplies. Hence it will proceed
along the road of the " String of Pearls ". It definitely views India's
dominance of the Indian ocean with hostility and will therefore try and
whittle latter's influence in the Indian Ocean Littorals. How far its
measures would eventually lead to military dominance of the Indian ocean at
the expense of India is anybody's guess. India is far from having a
deterrence capability against China in this regard. India has no capability
of enforcing its views in the border disputes with China. But sitting
astride the Indian ocean it can certainly take steps to put in place
deterrence capabilities against China in the Indian ocean . It is time India
thinks along this line before the string of pearls start choking India
(The writer, Mr S.Gopal, is currently occupying the Sir Ashutosh Mukherjee
Chair, in the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore. The article
is based on a paper presented by him at a seminar on "Rise of China –
Implications for China's neighbours", organised jointly by the Chennai
Centre for China Studies, Center for Asia Studies and Indian Centre for
South Asian Studies, at Chennai on 17 December 2010. The paper is to be
included in the edited volume of proceedings of the seminar , to be brought
out soon.
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