EVMs: Top security experts around the world write to Chief Election Commissioner of India

aug 15th, 2010

 

now that they have EVMs, why does the kkkangress need vote-banks? they can win any election through EVM fraud: you know, one-man, one-vote, one-time (that was 2004).

 

that brings up a breathtaking possibility -- the kkkangress does not have to pander to its mohammedan vote-bank any more!!!! that is, they can defraud and steal any election, with or without the aid of the mohammedans who vote en masse.

 

in other words, the kkkangress does not need to be dhimmi! but then, being dhimmi is so much part of their DNA that they will appease, crawl, and suck up to mohammedans anyway.

 

intriguing, though, isn't it? defraudable EVMs ki jai! that reduces the need to suck up to mohammedan and christist vote-banks!

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: kalyan

Subject: EVMs: Top security experts around the world write to Chief Election Commissioner of India
To:

Top security experts around the world write to Chief Election Commissioner of India , Dr. S.Y. Quraishi that Indian EVMs are not tamperproof and lack transparency 

Washington DC, Aug 12, 2010:  The following letter signed by top security experts around the world was written to S.Y. Quraishi, Election Commissioner of India after a panel discussion on Indian EVMs held at USENIX conference on Aug 9^th, 2010. 

USENIX Conference

Wardman Park Hotel

Washington, D.C. , USA

August 12, 2010  
 

Dr. S. Y. Quraishi,

Chief Election Commissioner Election Commission of India Nirvachan Sadan

Ashoka Road, New Delhi-110001, India

Dear Dr. Quraishi:

We, the undersigned participants in the 2010 Electronic Voting Technology Work-shop / Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE), had the privilege to attend a panel discussion on the state of India's electronic voting machines (EVMs). We greatly appreciate the participation of Dr. Alok Shukla, Deputy Election Commis-sioner, and Prof. P. V. Indiresan, Chairman of the Expert Committee, who were joined by G.V.L. Narasimha Rao of VeTA¹ and Prof. J. Alex Halderman of the University of Michigan. We were fascinated to learn about the complexities and challenges of conducting elections in the world's largest democracy, and about the Election Commission's accomplishments in this regard. However, as experts in electronic voting technology and computer security, we have significant concerns about the security, verifiability, and transparency of India's EVMs.

Although India's EVMs have a simple design that avoids many of the problems found in other direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machines, they are still vulnerable to a wide range of attacks. New classes of attacks have been discovered since the time the EVMs were introduced that render many of their security assumptions obsolete. Therefore, we conclude, after listening to the arguments of the panelists, that India's EVMs do not today provide security, verifiability, or transparency adequate for confidence in election results.

We urge the Election Commission to explore other forms of voting that are suitable to the Indian context and that do provide adequate transparency, verifiability, and security. Other democracies have adopted and then abandoned DRE voting as science's understanding of election security has progressed. Our research community has been involved in this process around the world, and you are welcome to draw on our collective experience and expertise as you see fit.

Sincerely,

¹Citizens for Verifiability, Transparency, and Accountability in Elections  

All affiliations are listed for identification only. 

Dr. Ben Adida

Harvard University

Dr. Josh Benaloh

Microsoft Research

Prof. Matt Blaze

University of Pennsylvania

Prof. Mike Byrne

Rice University

Joseph A. Calandrino

Princeton University

Rick Carback University of Maryland, Baltimore County

Stephen Checkoway

University of California, San Diego

Bill Cheswick

AT&T Shannon Labs

Prof. David Dill

Stanford University

Jeremy Epstein

Senior Computer Scientist, SRI International

Ariel J. Feldman

Princeton University

Russell A. Fink University of Maryland, Baltimore County

Prof. Ian Goldberg

University of Waterloo

Dr. Joseph Lorenzo Hall

University of California, Berkeley / Princeton University

Prof. Candice Hoke

Cleveland State University

Harri Hursti

CTO, Clear Ballot Group

Bo Lipari

Founder, New Yorkers for Verified Voting

Neal McBurnett

Election Audits

Dr. Peter G. Neumann

Principal Scientist SRI International Computer Science Laboratory

Prof. Ronald L. Rivest

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Prof. Hovav Shacham

University of California, San Diego

Prof. Alan T. Sherman

University of Maryland, Baltimore County

Prof. Philip B. Stark

University of California, Berkeley

Dr. Vanessa Teague

University of Melbourne

Prof. Poorvi L. Vora

George Washington University

Prof. Dan Wallach

Rice University Director, ACCURATE²

Kai Wang

University of California, San Diego

Luther Weeks

CTVotersCount.org  

²ACCURATE (A Center for Correct, Usable, Reliable, Auditable, and Transparent Elections) is a multi-institution voting research center funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF).

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For additional information, contact Alex Halderman, jhalderm@eecs. umich.edu, 609-558-2312. 

Web:           http://IndianEVM.com