China's March on South Asia

April 28th

for all those who harbor thoughts about china's 'peaceful rise' this should be an eye-opener. peaceful my left foot! and oh, since it is not written by a 'communalist, divisive, fundamentalist' hindu it must be true.

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http://www.jamestown.org /publications_details.php?volume_id=408&issue_id=3311 &article_id=2369649

CHINA BRIEF

Volume 5 Issue 9 ( April 26 , 2005 )

CHINA'S MARCH ON SOUTH ASIA

By Tarique Niazi

China is steadily extending its reach into South Asia with its growing
economic and strategic influence in the region. China's current trade volume
with all South Asian nations reaches close to $20 billion a year. Its
bilateral trade with India alone accounts for $13.6 billion a year, a number
set to grow to $25 billion in 2010 [1]. Except for New Delhi, Beijing runs
trade surpluses with all other partners, including Bangladesh, Nepal,
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. But China makes up for these trade deficits with
massive investment in the infrastructural development, socio-economic needs,
and above all energy production of its trade partners. Fast on the heels of
the U.S. offer of nuclear power plants to India, China has offered Pakistan
and Bangladesh nuclear power plants of its own to meet their energy needs.
Beijing also showers these nations with low-cost financial capital to help
their struggling development sector. The largest beneficiaries of this
economic aid are Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal – in that order.

China's Growing Strategic Influence

In keeping with its economic expansion, China has deepened its strategic
influence in the region, especially with India's immediate neighbors –
Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Beijing has long kept a close
strategic partnership with Islamabad, but its overtures to the remaining
countries were hobbled by the 1962 Sino-Indian war and its protracted pariah
status as the "communist other," which it endured until the early 1970s.
China's entrée in South Asia gained momentum only after its conversion to
the market economy in the 1980s, which filled its coffers with trade and
investment dollars. Its resultant economic strength opened the path into
South Asia, beyond Pakistan. China skillfully deployed economic incentives
to draw Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka into its strategic orbit.

For China, Bangladesh is a doorway into India's turbulent northeastern
region, including the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, to which China lays
territorial claims. More importantly, Bangladesh is believed to be causing a
seismic demographic shift in another northeastern state, Assam, where Indian
leaders claim some 20 million Bangladeshis have moved in. Indian officials
fear the emergence of Assam as the second Muslim-majority state within the
Indian union, after the state of Jammu and Kashmir. [2] Above all, China
prizes Bangladesh for its immense natural gas reserves (60 trillion cubic
feet) which rival those of Indonesia. Bangladesh's geographic proximity with
Myanmar makes these reserves accessible to China. India's access to
Myanmar's gas reserves also hinges on Dhaka's willingness to allow a passage
for laying a gas pipeline – a fact not lost on Beijing.

Unlike Bangladesh, Nepal has little energy potential to tempt Beijing, but
its strategic location between China and India makes it just as important.
Nepal's borders meet China's restive western province of Tibet on the one
hand, and Naxalite-dominated Indian states on the other. [3] Nepal's Maoist
insurgents, who control the vast swath of the countryside, have cross-border
links with Naxalite Maoists in India as well. Almost 40% of India's 593
districts are, to a degree, under Naxalite influence. As a result, both
China and India vie for Katmandu's favor. Since the replacement of Nepal's
democratic government with an absolute monarchy in February of this year,
India has cold-shouldered Nepal's King Gyanendra, while China has dismissed
the seizure of power as an "internal matter". [4] In return, China wants the
new ruler to stay clear of any foreign (Indian or the U.S.) influence that
could make trouble in Tibet. To further the goal of status quo in Tibet,
China is integrating Nepal into the Tibetan economy, and laying a highway
that will connect the two.

In the same way, Beijing cherishes exclusive friendly relations with Sri
Lanka, which occupies a strategically important heft of the Indian Ocean
stretching from the Middle East to Southeast Asia. After 9/11, the U.S.
sought access to Sri Lankan ports, airfields and air space for its armed
forces under the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA). The ACSA
is the first such agreement between Sri Lanka and a Western power since its
independence in 1948. (Though in the early 1980s, Colombo allowed a radio
transmitter on its territory to beam the Voice of America broadcasts into
China, Myanmar, and North Korea.) Both China and India would prefer Sri
Lanka to stay out of Western alliances, as they jostle for their respective
dominant positions. Sri Lanka's prolonged ethnic conflict between its
Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority has, however, strained relations
between Colombo and New Delhi. India, having a Tamil-majority state of its
own, treads cautiously in mediating the conflict, which makes it suspect
with Colombo. China, however, has no such concerns to balance, and as a
result boldly vouches for Sri Lanka's territorial integrity with little
regard for the national aspirations of the Tamil minority.

Of all these nations, Pakistan's strategic significance is, nevertheless,
priceless for China. Although a smaller nation, Pakistan rivals India in
unconventional weapons. It has long denied India access to western and
Central Asian nations, while at the same time literally paving the highway –
Karakoram – for Beijing's direct access to Eurasia. Above all, it has tied
down 500,000 to 700,000 Indian troops in the Kashmir Valley for the past 15
years. By keeping hundreds of thousands of Indian troops engaged in Kashmir,
Pakistan indirectly helps ease India's challenge to China's defenses on
their disputed border. More importantly, Pakistan emboldens the region's
smaller economies to stand up to India and seek Chinese patronage, which
hurts India's stature in the region.

China's Diplomatic Triumph

Besides these strategic gains, China has also benefited diplomatically from
its growing influence with Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.
Today, all of these nations affirm the "one-China" policy that views Taiwan
as an "inalienable" part of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Similarly,
they are aligned with Beijing on the equally sensitive issue of Tibet, with
the result that they all shun the Dalai Lama to Beijing's delight while
proclaiming that Tibet is an integral part of China. In view of China's
eagerness to join the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC), which presently represents the seven nations of Bangladesh, Bhutan,
India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, they speak with one voice
for Beijing's entry into the SAARC – to the palpable annoyance of New Delhi.

India, as the resident power of South Asia, considers the region its "near
abroad," and does not want Beijing to step on to its turf. What unnerves
India most is China's unblinking eye on South Asia's biggest prize: the
Indian Ocean. China has long been vying for access to this important
waterway – most recently by building a deep-sea port in Gwadar, Pakistan,
along the Arabian Sea coast. (see "Gwadar: China's Naval Outpost on the
Indian Ocean" in China Brief, Vol 5, Iss 4) As much as India would like to
push China out of its sphere of influence, it does not have the regional or
international clout to stem Beijing's march on South Asia or the Indian
Ocean.

China, however, does its part to calm the nerves in New Delhi. Prime
Minister Wen Jiabao's four-day visit this month (April 9-11) to India
attests to China's charm offensive on New Delhi. China's major goal behind
this offensive is to keep India from forging military and strategic
alliances with the U.S. against Beijing's territorial interests, i.e.,
reunification of Taiwan with mainland China. China, well aware of India's
historical concerns for its territorial integrity, deftly plays on its
nationalist instincts and its visceral aversion to foreign powers. Therefore
it comes as no surprise that Wen was able to convince New Delhi to agree to
form the "India-China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and
Prosperity." The partnership has been touted in Beijing as "the most
significant achievement" of Wen's four-nation tour (April 5-12), which took
him to Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. [5]

Wen Goes to New Delhi

China's role in the treaty has been to offer New Delhi mainly symbolic
concessions. First, China accepted the long-disputed territory of Sikkim as
part of the Indian Union. Prime Minister Wen even presented Indian Prime
Minister Man Mohan Singh with cartographic evidence of his government's
changed stance: an official map that shows Sikkim in India. In response, New
Delhi has already backed off its long-held stand on Tibet, accepting it as
an integral part of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Second, New Delhi
agreed to accept the status quo on their border dispute until a mutually
satisfying resolution is found. China, however, wants to keep Aksai Chin, an
area of 35,000 square miles in Ladakh, Kashmir, which it seized from India
in 1962. Aksai Chin offers a rare strategic inroad into China's restive
western region of Xinjiang, which makes it even harder for China to let go
of it. Third, China agreed to India's bid for a United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) seat, without specifying its endorsement for veto power.
Fourth, China has softened its traditional commitment to Pakistan on
Kashmir. Part of China's change of heart on Kashmir also has to do with the
reported infiltration of Muslim fighters from Kashmir into the Chinese
Muslim-majority autonomous region of Xinjiang.

China, however, seems sincere in making these concessions, whatever their
worth, to New Delhi in order to forge a "strategic partnership." For its
part, India is willing to accept this arrangement to boost bilateral trade
and ensure energy security, which New Delhi views as a national security
matter. Moreover, China is poised to overtake the United States, with
bilateral trade of $20 billion a year, as India's largest trading partner
for the foreseeable future. India's giant appetite for energy resources will
soon rank it as the world's third largest consumer of fossil fuels after the
U.S. and China. New Delhi hopes its strategic partnership with Beijing will
help sate that appetite without bidding up global energy prices.

Besides calming India, another challenge for China is to keep Pakistan on
its side. Islamabad has a long history of military alliances with the U.S.
starting from CENTO and SEATO in the past to its present status as the
U.S.'s non-NATO ally. And unlike India, Pakistan always has been malleable
to Western influence. To staunch such possibility in the future, Wen has
drawn Pakistan into signing a "Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Good
Neighborly Relations," which binds both signatories to desist from joining
"any alliance or bloc which infringes upon the sovereignty, security, and
territorial integrity of the other side" [7]. Gen. Pervez Musharraf,
Pakistan's president, kept the contents of the Treaty under wraps by
disallowing the release of its full text, which China's People's Daily had
published anyway. Nevertheless it is obvious which of the two will have to
avoid unwanted alliances, and whose interest of "sovereignty, security, and
territorial integrity" will be affected.

Conclusion

China has invested in South Asia's smaller economies of Bangladesh, Nepal,
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka to gain a strategic foothold and build a diplomatic
profile in the region. This effort has transformed the region from India's
purported "near abroad" into China's own backyard. Its strengthened position
in the region has enabled Beijing to make peace with New Delhi, drawing it
out of strategic partnerships with the West. As a result, South Asia is now
more likely to line up behind Beijing to defend its position on the Taiwan
Strait as its "inalienable part," while freeing up Beijing's diplomatic and
strategic resources to tame its apparently untamable Asian rival – Japan.

Tarique Niazi teaches Environmental Sociology at the University of
Wisconsin, Eau Clair, specializing in resource-based conflict.