Friday, June 19, 2020

Why Xi Wants War: His Own Self Preservation

On further thought, I'm thinking that we may need to find other ways to respond, like putting Xi on the back foot and going after him personally. Even if we can't play directly into Xi's hands with a full-blown ground war, we need to fully disengage with China economically, and also loudly denounce Xi personally at every international forum, and to speak up every time China bullies another neighbor.

Xi is the reason why this latest aggression in Ladakh is now suddenly happening. Certainly, China was always going to continue doing such land grabs - but the timing of this latest move is due to Xi's own political predicament. There is a massive economic slowdown happening in his country, and a massive international backlash against his govt, all due to its mishandling of the Coronavirus. Xi's dictatorship fears its people first and foremost, and accordingly has set about stoking up as many conflicts on China's periphery as possible, hoping at least one of these gambits will result in a war that Xi needs to serve as a distraction from himself.He doesn't care how many of his own countrymen he sends to their deaths, just as long as he can preserve himself and his own position as supreme leader and “chairman of everything.”

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/06/18/asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/beijing-coronavirus-xi-china/#.XuxLgEVKi70

When Xi's actions are primarily driven by a fear of his own people, then they are the best weapon to stoke up against him.

3 comments:

Pagan said...

1. You are late to the 'decouple from China' party, San.. Most nations are well on their way doing just that.. The EU recently signed an FTA with Vietnam.. The US is looking to 'near source' to Mexico and Columbia. China will be in serious economic trouble by 2022. If only the Japanese are not so laid-back about this.

2. This is not sudden action on Chinaa's part.. Salami Slicing is in their DNA and they executed it to perfection.. Abrogation of Article 370 gave them the narrative that they could exploit, as Lt Gen (Retd) HS Panag said.

Sactown Bobby said...

disagree with what HS Panag said. Do you think they were just waiting for 370 abrogation to go ahead with this. the analysis is pedantic - funny you are falling for it.

Pagan said...

This comment by an Indian guy on Breitbart suggests there is a lot more going on behind China's actions:

The confrontation at Galwan valley is because China has intruded in order to dominate the D-S-DBO (Durbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldi) Road.
The PLA intrusion on the northern shore of Pangong Tso is connected with the intrusion in the Galwan valley. Durbuk, where the D-S-DBO road starts, is about three hours run from Lukung at the western tip of Pangong Tso.


Pakistani forces pushing eastwards from Skardo upstream along Shyok river, to link with PLA simultaneously pushing westwards from Pangong Tso, Galwan valley and Chang Chenmo valley going downstream along Shyok river, can cut off all of Ladakh north of the Ladakh mountain range from the rest of India and create a totally new LAC both with China and Pakistan.

This possible link-up is clearly a very serious threat to the whole of Ladakh, and India’s territorial integrity, besides putting paid to India’s legitimate claim on Baltistan-Gilgit part of POK. India holding the Siachen glacier and constructing the D-S-DBO road is precisely to keep Ladakh safe from both China and Pakistan.

With PLA’s probable present ground-position superiority at Galwan, the possibility of PLA enlarging intrusions on the D-S-DBO axis cannot be discounted. But surely this would have been foreseen and pre-emptive action taken accordingly. It involves induction and commitment of IA and IAF resources both for logistics and operations, and this cannot but be at the cost of reductions elsewhere.

China’s game is of incremental, stealthy capture of territory simultaneously in widely separated areas. PLA comes forward X-km and when a face-off happens followed by talks, agrees to withdraw X/2-km and then justifies building up military infrastructure to “prevent India from occupying Chinese territory”. The incursion/intrusion becomes an encroachment, giving fresh meaning to the “A” in LAC.

In Ladakh, this has happened east of Depsangla, east of Burtse, and now at Galwan and Pangong Tso. All are directed at interdiction of India’s D-S-DBO road and eventually Siachen glacier, by gaining valuable tactical advantage over territory. China’s “creeping capture” by small tactical gains, steadily enhances its strategy of linking up with Pakistani forces in Baltistan-Gilgit POK along Shyok river. This will continue unless political policy permits IA to stand firm, fight back incursions/intrusions and evict encroachments.

China is much too embroiled in its internal issues (as though India is not!) to engage in a war, howsoever short and intense, and Pakistan can be neutralized at least temporarily by international pressure to prevent opening a second front. If this is a correct strategic assessment, India’s political leadership may show the same spirit that it showed against Pakistan following the Uri attack.

The fighting capability of India’s soldier is legendary, but can be effective only if he has the backing of the nation in the larger context (which he has always had) and more immediately and importantly, of the political decision-makers (which he did not have in 1962, but did in 1965 and 1971).