Sunday, January 31, 2010
ian buruma in wsj: why the chinese oppose free information flow
Ashley Tellis: New Delhi, Washington: Who gets what?
From: Ram
THE TIMES OF INDIA, JANUARY 30, 2010
New Delhi, Washington: Who gets what?
Ashley Tellis
When the transformation of US-India relations was just beginning early in the Bush administration, the then US ambassador to India, Robert D Blackwill, asked a group of Americans and Indians gathered in Aspen, Colorado, a pregnant question. In Sanjaya Baru's recent retelling, Blackwill directly challenged his interlocutors: "India wants the US to invest, India wants the US to keep its markets more open, India wants more visas for its professionals, India wants us to be helpful on Kashmir and in dealing with Pakistan, India wants US support for membership of the UN Security Council, India wants this and India wants that. Tell me what will India give in return?"
... deleted
Voice of India Features Newsletter - 24 January 2009
From: VOI Features <voi.features@vhs-net.com>
Date: Wed, Jan 27, 2010 at 3:42 PM
Subject: Voice of India Features Newsletter - 24 January 2009
To:
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Nitin Pai's rebuttal to BARBARA CROSSETTE rant in foreign policy
From: sri
The Elephant in the room
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/04/the_elephant_in_the_room?page=0,1
Rebuttal by Nitin Pai:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/07/why_india_is_no_villain
Why India Is No Villain
Barbara Crossette is wrong: This rising power helps solve far more problems than it creates.
BY NITIN PAI | JANUARY 7, 2010
According to the Financial Times' Lucy Kellaway, "Elephant in the Room" was the most popular cliché to appear in major newspapers and journals in 2009. It is perhaps appropriate then that Barbara Crossette's latest diatribe against India appeared in Foreign Policy under that headline. Although it claims to show that India causes "the most global consternation" and "gives global governance the biggest headache," it is merely a series of rants and newsroom clichés selected entirely arbitrarily to support the author's prejudice.
... deleted
KUMAR FOR CONGRESS
From: <KatariaN
KUMAR FOR CONGRESS
Dear friends,
I have known Vijay Kumar for nearly thirty years and has been a great friend of mine. He is dedicated, intellectually honest, a true visionary, and a profound political thinker.
Vijay has sensibly proclaimed that there is no such a thing as a "War on Terror" because terrorism is only a technique, a tool, a tactic in a much larger war -- Universal Jihad. Universal Jihad is a threat to the entire free word, and it is a war that can be won only if we acknowledge that it's a war against humanity.
In terms of foreign and domestic policy, he has seen up close what militant Islam can do to a country and a culture, so he uniquely understands the consequences to America and to liberal democracies all over the world. That's why in 2008, he was the first politician to run on an anti-Sharia platform and his message was very well received. Within two months of launching his web-site, Vijay received almost one
third of the primary votes.
Vijay also has a realistic plan to win America's wars in Afghanistan and Iraq within five years, for less than a billion dollars, and without the further loss of precious American lives. No other politician in America is proposing anything even close, because they do not understand that it is a war between theocracy and democracy, between fanaticism and reason.
Vijay has profound respect for the American people who have turned out in droves, at their own expense and inconvenience, to attend town hall meetings and Tea Parties and demonstrations in an effort to try and get Washington listen, only to be ignored and demeaned by the political machine and the mainstream media. He wants to take their message into the very halls of Congress and make it echo loud and clear.
I have profound respect for Vijay's intellectual honesty and moral courage. We need leaders like him. First, though, he needs to win the election. Please help him in any way you can. The greatest need in any campaign is money to pay for ways to get the message out to the public, so any amount you can donate is deeply appreciated.
Please visit his website for further information. www.Kumarfor Congress.com.
Respectfully,
Narain Kataria
kanchan: obama sups with the taliban
The Wages of Sepoyhood
From: K
Commonwealth Games map shows J&K, Gujarat in Pak ************************************************************************************************** Time to crawl out of the colonial/ex-colonial dung heap? Of course, membership in said dung heap was very kindly volunteered by, guess who? Nehru! |
Saturday, January 30, 2010
vanity, hypocricy and indolence: the roots of indian communism
that may be true - but what about the ideological opposite i.e. Indian communists?
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1100119/jsp/opinion/story_12001537.jsp
the psychological roots of indian communism are nearly all negative. it was founded and sustained by privileged and indolent people - and so it has remained. if these people felt so much 'sympathy'* for the poor, would it not be better for them to work to change the economic base of the country? - as opposed to shout slogans and never put in an honest day's work
* - indian communist 'sympathy' is a terrible thing. it appears as sympathy - in reality it is vanity - a sort of self-congratulation. people celebrating their own comfort and excusing themselves of real responsibility of work
dawkins: pat robertson's comment on haiti was true christism, so what's your problem?
Pak India peace, strategically impossible by Dr Subhash Kapila
From: Sanjeev
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Fwd: Nazis and jihadis
From: S
Why the Peaceful Majority is Irrelevant
by Paul E. Marek
I used to know a man whose family were German aristocracy prior to World War Two. They owned a number of large industries and estates. I asked him how many German people were true Nazis, and the answer he gave has stuck with me and guided my attitude toward fanaticism ever since.
"Very few people were true Nazis" he said, "but, many enjoyed the return of German pride, and many more were too busy to care. I was one of those who just thought the Nazis were a bunch of fools. So, the majority just sat back and let it all happen. Then, before we knew it, they owned us, and we had lost control, and the end of the world had come. My family lost everything. I ended up in a concentration camp and the Allies destroyed my factories."
We are told again and again by "experts" and "talking heads" that Islam is the religion of peace, and that the vast majority of Muslims just want to live in peace. Although this unquantified assertion may be true, it is entirely irrelevant. It is meaningless fluff, meant to make us feel better, and meant to somehow diminish the specter of fanatics rampaging across the globe in the name of Islam. The fact is, that the fanatics rule Islam at this moment in history. It is the fanatics who march. It is the fanatics who wage any one of 50 shooting wars world wide. It is the fanatics who systematically slaughter Christian or tribal groups throughout Africa and are gradually taking over the entire continent in an Islamic wave. It is the fanatics who bomb, behead, murder, or honor kill. It is the fanatics who take over mosque after mosque. It is the fanatics who zealously spread the stoning and hanging of rape victims and homosexuals. The hard quantifiable fact is, that the "peaceful majority" is the "silent majority" and it is cowed and extraneous.
Communist Russia was comprised of Russians who just wanted to live in peace, yet the Russian Communists were responsible for the murder of about 20 million people. The peaceful majority were irrelevant. China's huge population was peaceful as well, but Chinese Communists managed to kill a staggering 70 million people. The Average Japanese individual prior to World War 2 was not a war mongering sadist. Yet, Japan murdered and slaughtered its way across South East Asia in an orgy of Killing that included the systematic killing of 12 million Chinese civilians; most killed by sword, shovel, and bayonet. And, who can forget Rwanda, which collapsed into butchery. Could it not be said that the majority of Rwandans were "peace loving".
History lessons are often incredibly simple and blunt, yet for all our powers of reason we often miss the most basic and uncomplicated of points. Peace-loving Muslims have been made irrelevant by the fanatics. Peace-loving Muslims have been made irrelevant by their silence. Peace-loving Muslims will become our enemy if they don't speak up, because like my friend from Germany, they will awake one day and find that the fanatics own them, and the end of their world will have begun. Peace-loving Germans, Japanese, Chinese, Russians, Rwandans, Bosnians, Afghans, Iraqis, Palestinians, Somalis, Nigerians, Algerians, and many others, have died because the peaceful majority did not speak up until it was too late. As for us who watch it all unfold, we must pay attention to the only group that counts; the fanatics who threaten our way of life.
intriguing take on the iPad: Thanks, but I'm waiting for the DroidPad
From: SiliconValley.com
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on anti-hindu propaganda: How Free Are We?
From: <info@hinduwisdom.info>
Date: Sat, Jan 30, 2010 at 2:01 AM
Subject: How Free Are We?
To: rajeev srinivasan
How Free Are We?
Yes, the rise of Hindu nationalism is indeed a major threat to intellectual freedom in the study of India, but it's also time to confront a climate of implicit censorship that leads to its own pathology.
This has been a tumultuous decade for the academic study of India. In his recent Offence: The Hindu Case (2009), Salil Tripathi provides a timely overview of the growing censorship and harassment that scholars working on India have faced. Not a pretty sight to behold: people have felt the need to ban books and terrorize authors, hassle teachers and disrupt classes, toss eggs at some and blacken others' faces. Academics now run the risk of smear campaigns, court cases and physical intimidation; all because certain groups feel offended by what they write about the Indian past or the Hindu traditions. The facts are difficult to miss. Hence, the threat that Hindu nationalism poses to academic freedom has caused commotion around the world.
According to Tripathi, the rise of Hindu nationalism is indeed the major threat to intellectual freedom in the study of India. In his essay, all Indians concerned about the representation of India and its traditions come across as bigots and prudes. The goondas who burned M.F. Husain's paintings and ransacked the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute are presented as the extremist fringe of a 'long arm of fundamentalism' that also embraces NRI professionals and Western Hindu sympathisers. On the other side, Tripathi places historians like Romila Thapar and religion scholars like Wendy Doniger, who (so he claims) go as far as 'the facts' take them and are attacked for doing so (75-87). These scholars are presented as spirited fighters 'arguing for academic freedom and the spirit of open inquiry in India' (86). This way of presenting things is flawed. Like most journalists, Tripathi ignores another threat to intellectual freedom in the study of India—one that may be less manifest, but is all the more insidious.
A climate of implicit censorship has long dominated this field. Not quite as spectacular as the rise of 'Hindu' censorship, this is not the stuff of juicy journalism. But this kind of censoring is as harmful: it also moulds people's minds in particular ways; it constrains their speech; it compels them to show compliance to certain dogmas in their writings; and, for the unlucky few, it may even end their careers. The difficulty is to identify the modus operandi of this form of censorship. Much like racism, it is only in certain blatant cases that one can say with certainty that it has occurred. Nonetheless, we have to try and circumscribe this obstacle standing in the way of a much-needed rejuvenation of the study of India. What follows are some impressions of the situation in contemporary Europe, India and the USA. Sometimes these may seem caricatures, but caricature is required to make the implicit explicit.
In Europe, the issue cannot be separated from the colonial past and the present state of affairs, where the old continent is losing its earlier dominance to rising Asian nations that outpace it in every way. In response, Europeans have developed a set of strategies to convince themselves that their civilization is still morally superior. Here, scholars of India have an important role to fulfil. Simply put, they are expected to do the following: acknowledge that India is indeed going through swift economic growth; next, point out that it still has tremendous poverty, the caste system, superstition, religious conflicts, gender inequality, exploitation, child labour, nepotism, bribery, revolts, incompetence...; and provide appropriate details on these flaws and the necessary footnotes or fieldwork. In this way, these scholars should contribute to what John Gray calls the 'comfort blanket against an unfamiliar world', which Europe is weaving around itself. 'Rest assured; we are still on top'.
Naturally, few scholars today would be willing to state explicitly that the European civilization is superior. Yet, while they disavow Eurocentrism, they also reproduce a deep-rooted cultural asymmetry. When European scholars describe India, they tend to connect all ills and atrocities in that society to the nature of Indian culture. One links widow-burning, dowry murder, domestic violence, female infanticide and caste discrimination to 'Hindu' foundations. Europe also loves to celebrate Indian authors whose specialty is revealing the 'dark underbelly' of Indian society. In contrast, social ills and atrocities in European societies are characterised as aberrations: racism, colonial genocide, the two World Wars, the Holocaust, sexual abuse, etc. are considered as acts that deviate from the true temper of European culture. This stance of cultural asymmetry has become the hidden premise of the European study of India.
Historically, the situation in India has grown from much the same set of equations. The colonial state nourished an intellectual class that was expected to spell out and justify its 'civilising mission'. The intelligentsia had to show how western political theory had laid down the way forward for India and how the state was the guide on this road. It sought to demonstrate that Indian history and society—and 'Hindu religion' in particular—embodied the negation of western liberal norms: inequality, irrationality, tyranny (at a later stage, patriarchy was added). The postcolonial state inherited the institutional structures and conceptual framework of its colonial predecessor and also its tendency to treat the human sciences as instruments of the state's project to reform society. Crudely put, academics in these disciplines could play two roles: ideologues were to show the significance of some western political theory to India and characterise Indian history and society in such a way that the implementation of this political theory became the only option; fact-gatherers had to collect the data related to some problem for the state's project of reform.
Over the years, the fashionable theories shifted from liberalism to Marxism and back again. Generally, the adherents of this approach to Indian society called themselves 'secularists' and shared one central attitude: they were allergic to 'Hinduism'. In the first five decades following Independence, these secularists dominated the Indian universities and established an intellectual and institutional hegemony. They wrote the textbooks and dominated the UGC, ICSSR or ICHR. By the 1980s, when orthodox Marxism had worn out in most places, the hegemony was so entrenched that it allowed a few universities and research institutes in Delhi and Calcutta to perform a role very similar to that of the colonial master. They imported the latest 'radical' fashions from Paris and New York to couch an old story in the newest jargon: they used Foucault's 'discourse' and 'capillary power' or Gramsci's 'hegemony' to repeat that the Indian culture promoted inequality, patriarchy and moral bankruptcy. Social scientists in the hinterland were expected to imitate the secularists from the metropolis. If they did well, they could end up in JNU or perhaps even be invited to the West. This hegemony of the secularists reproduced itself through different forms of implicit censorship: it determined what was published, where the funding went, and who got appointed.
At the same time, there was a growing sense of alienation between these intellectual classes and substantial layers of Indian society. The rise of Hindutva produced a backlash against the academic allergy to Hinduism. When the BJP came to power in the late 1990s, Hindu nationalism tried to displace secularism by attempting to take over the institutional hegemony and modes of censorship that the secularists had created. Now, Hindu nationalists took it upon themselves to write the textbooks and control the universities and the relevant government bodies. However, these people had neither the education nor the sophistication to do so in the (relatively) subtle ways of the secularists. The crudeness led to outcries in India and the West about 'rewriting history', 'the end of academic freedom' and 'the return of censorship'. The message to the Hindu nationalists must be clear: learn from the secularists how to practice the art of censorship in more implicit and subtle ways. Whatever the future may bring, the humanities in India have now been hijacked by this struggle between secularism and Hindutva.
The rise of Hindutva has also determined the current state of affairs in the American study of India and Hinduism. Here, the implicit censorship takes the form of a climate of fear: the fear to be branded 'Hindutva'. There are three central factors in US society that have contributed to this pernicious climate. One is the large-scale migration of highly-educated Indians into the US over the last few decades. Affluent Hindu-Americans have been shocked by what the American schools teach their children about 'Hinduism' and India. Turning to the universities, they discovered that these often tell the same story, albeit with more theoretical sophistication. Many Hindu-Americans are highly successful in engineering, business or other professions; many also sympathize at some level with Hindu nationalism. Shocked by the western representation of 'Hinduism', they think they can now replace this with a 'Hindu' representation. They do not realise that it takes more than intelligence and professional success to develop an alternative to five centuries of Orientalism. After retirement, some of these professionals take up the hobby of writing stories about India that no intellectual will ever take seriously.
The second factor lies in the many forms of Protestant Christianity that dominate American society. The theological framework shared by these denominations inevitably transforms the Hindu traditions into a species of false religion. Naturally, political correctness no longer allows scholars and educators to speak of 'heathen idolatry' or the 'cruelty' and 'tyranny' of 'false religion'. Therefore, they have turned to seemingly 'secular' depictions of caste, inequality, patriarchy and poverty in India to show that Hinduism is a pale and erring religion, opposed to liberal values. The earlier religious condemnation has become a social critique. Often, both go hand in hand. For instance, American evangelical organisations join forces with scholarly critics of caste to promote the idea that India should become 'post-Hindu', as in the case of Kancha Ilaiah and the Dalit Freedom Network.
The third factor is the most interesting: it is the potential for implicit censorship that seems intrinsic to the US academic world. This is difficult to pin down. The witch hunts organized by Senator McCarthy during the Cold War played a significant role in creating this atmosphere. The terror of being denounced as a 'traitor' penetrated the American humanities at a deep level. To someone who has no first-hand experience of the academic study of India in the US, it must be difficult to imagine the number of young scholars who say things like 'this is what I really think, but I will not say it in public, because I'm up for tenure'. By the time they receive tenure, they have usually conformed to the orthodoxy.
Together these factors have produced an unhappy mix. There is a cold war going on between the 'Hindu-Americans' (and a few academic sympathisers) and the mainstream scholars of Hinduism. Academics no longer fear being called 'commies', 'reds' or even 'heathens', but now 'Hindutva' has taken the place of such labels in the study of India. If one makes positive noises about the contributions of Indian culture to humanity, one runs the risk of being associated with 'Hindu nationalism' or with the NRI professionals who aggressively challenge the doyens of Hinduism studies. The popular media like to represent these doyens as valiant warriors for academic freedom, much as Tripathi does in his essay. This is far removed from reality. The dominant scholars too impose dogmatic limits that one cannot cross without provoking their ire. Because of the significance of letters of recommendation, peer pressure and plain gossip in American academic circles, their forms of implicit censorship are highly effective in making or breaking careers. This has created a widespread fear of saying 'the wrong thing', which paralyses the study of Indian culture.
In one sense, then, the picture for students of India is even grimmer than the one Tripathi sketches. In another sense, there is hope, because times of turbulence also hold the potential for intellectual change. As students of India, we will have to take seriously the growing discontent among Hindus about the ways in which their traditions have been depicted. Some of this is inspired by an attempt to sanitise the Hindu traditions according to the model of Islam and Christianity and the prudishness of middle-class morality. However, other strands express a deep sense of grievance towards the secularist hegemony and the academic allergy to Hinduism. As long as reasonable and well-educated minds do not address these grievances, Hindu nationalism will be able to tap into the growing anger among Hindus and manipulate this to its own benefit. To address such problems, one needs to work towards a climate of intellectual freedom that has too long been absent from the study of India.
Jakob De Roover is at the Research Centre Vergelijkende Cultuurwetenschap, Ghent University, Belgium
Russia's 5th-Gen Fighter takes to the skies
This is the Russian answer to the American F-22 Raptor. India is the only country Russia is partnering with in this program. We would see 250 of these magnificent birds in IAF colors over the next 30-40 years.
Friday, January 29, 2010
Double speak by Leftist (JNU) - they don't want reservations in JNU
From: Bharath
Date: Fri, Jan 29, 2010 at 6:09 AM
Subject: Double speak by Leftist (JNU) - they don't want reservations in JNU
To:
4M Report - 17 Jan 2010
From: Arvind
http://www.sabha.info/4mreport.html
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solar powered Bibles to Haiti
From: senthil
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60I02S20100119
ethnic cleansing of kashmiri pundits: To forget IS to forgive
From: Yashwini
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rajeev oped in new indian express on obama's rebooted 2.0 incarnation
One can only hope Obama 2.0 will fare better
It is telling when Apple CEO Steve Jobs upstages the US president. That's exactly what happened on January 27, when the announcement of Apple's new iPad got more attention than Barack Obama's state-of-the-union address, which is a combination of self-report card and roadmap for the future. Ironically, Obama talked mostly about jobs (the other kind), as unemployment persists.
Overhanging Obama's speech was the electoral shock from Massachusetts: the late Edward Kennedy's US Senate seat was captured by a centre-right Republican. That too, in solidly Democratic Massachusetts, where left-liberal icon Kennedy had held the seat for 46 years.Suddenly, Obama's domestic agenda, and its kingpin, healthcare, are in trouble. It is hard to believe, after the euphoria of 2008, that Obama's place in history may well depend on a single vote in the US Senate. But it does: the 60-40 super-majority that allowed Obama to bulldoze legislation through is gone, and he needs detente with the opposition Republicans.
That in itself is a failure: Obama had promised change and a bipartisan consensus, and his party still dominates both houses of parliament; yet, he was unable to push Obamacare through, and is back-pedalling furiously. The speech was mostly about the economy, banks, and jobs. "Jobs must be our No 1 focus". Foreign policy — with two ongoing wars and a rampaging China — was ignored.
A Pew Research Center poll dated January 25 on the public's priorities suggested that the economy, jobs and terrorism are top of mind; healthcare coming much lower. It appears that Obama erred in focusing too much on the worthy, but apparently not seen as urgent, matter of health insurance. Similarly, energy security and global warming have taken a back seat, which are occupied by economic fear. Not surprisingly, the poll accurately foreshadowed the tone of the address.
To be fair, Obama has not done all that badly; but expectations were so inflated that there was bound to be a letdown, especially among those afflicted by a 'Messiah Syndrome'. His all-important approval ratings fell below 50 per cent in January.
Obama did inherit large problems: two wars, and the global financial meltdown. It is true that another Great Depression was fended off (although the credit should go to the Federal Reserve), there has been movement towards containing healthcare costs, and Iraq (but not Afghanistan) seems to be stabilising. Obama has presented a kinder, gentler America, whose brand equity has improved.
Obama's deliberate, Olympian style suggests — perhaps unfairly — paralysis by analysis. The dithering over Afghan policy for eight months, and the plan to 'surge, bribe, declare victory and run like hell', have hurt India's interests. An Obama, desperate to pull out of Afghanistan, is leaning on India to cave in on Kashmir, in order to appease Pakistan.
It appears that Obama has allowed his agenda to be hijacked by several factors: an exaggerated internationalism, a certain hubris, a permanent campaign mode, and an unwillingness to rein in ideologues.
Internationalism is good in theory, but not at the expense of domestic agendas. Obama may have overdone the reaching-out bit. He spent more time abroad than any other US president. Obama chose to alienate America's friends and appease its foes. India was shown that it did not matter, but Obama was the picture of charm with China, militant West Asians, and Iran: predictably, he got little in return. He reached out to the Islamic faith in his Cairo and Ankara speeches, but this was construed as weakness, and al-Qaeda/Taliban are rampant. The Chinese disdain him: they humiliated him in Copenhagen.
Obama seems to have some trouble switching from campaigning — where he can make promises — to governing — where he has to deliver. Some of his actions seem predicated on PR: the timetable for the pullout of troops from Afghanistan is meant to give him a boost in the 2010 and 2012 elections.
Finally, Obama is not reining in his more rabid supporters. Some of them believe that there was a permanent shift to the left in 2008. No, especially as a result of tough economic times, there has been a shift to the right.
If Obama is able to curb his vanity, his internationalism, and the more extreme of his supporters, and, the economy improves he may well rebound. As of now, he has been forced to reboot. We can only hope Obama 2.0 will fare better.